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GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786

CRITICALFix: enchant97/note-mark@18b5877

GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) vulnerability in github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Note Mark has a JWT Secret Weakness that allows Full Account Takeover via Token Forgery

Also known asCVE-2026-44523GO-2026-5567
Published
May 7, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

No minimum length or entropy is enforced on the JWT_SECRET configuration value. The application accepts any base64-decodable secret regardless of size, including secrets as short as 1 byte.

HS256 secrets below 32 bytes are brute-forceable offline, allowing attackers to recover the signing key and forge valid JWTs for arbitrary users.


Impact

An attacker who captures a single valid JWT (e.g, from cookies, logs, or network traffic) can:

> Crack the signing secret offline using brute-force or wordlist attacks > Forge valid JWTs for any user ID (including administrators) > Authenticate without knowing any credentials

This results in full account takeover across the entire application with no server-side detection or rate limiting possible.


Details

In backend/config/utils.go, the Base64Decoded.UnmarshalText function decodes the JWT secret but does not validate its length or entropy.

In backend/core/auth.go, JWT tokens are signed using HS256 without enforcing minimum key size requirements.

According to RFC 7518 Section 3.2, HS256 keys must be at least 256 bits (32 bytes). Libraries such as PyJWT explicitly warn against shorter keys, but note-mark performs no such validation.


PoC

1- Deploy note-mark with a weak secret:

JWT_SECRET = base64("testsecret123456789012345")

2- Register an account and capture the Auth-Session-Token cookie

3- Crack the secret offline (example using Python):

import jwt, base64
jwt.decode(TOKEN, base64.b64decode(SECRET), algorithms=["HS256"])

4- Forge a new token for any user UUID with extended expiry

5- Send the forged token in requests → server returns 200 Ok and authenticates as that user


Reproduction Steps

1- Deploy the application with a JWT secret shorter than 32 bytes (after base64 decoding) 2- Authenticate and capture a valid JWT 3- Perform offline brute-force or dictionary attack against the token signature 4- Recover the secret 5- Generate a forged JWT for another user 6- Use the forged token to access protected endpoints


Fix Recommendation

  • Enforce a minimum of 32 bytes (256 bits) for JWT secrets after base64 decoding
  • Reject weak secrets during configuration parsing (e.g., in Base64Decoded.UnmarshalText or config validation)
  • Optionally log warnings or fail startup if the secret is insecure

Resources

  • RFC 7518 Section 3.2 (JSON Web Algorithms - HMAC key size requirements)
  • CWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength
  • CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/enchant97/note-mark/backendall versions0.0.0-20260501152247-18b587758667

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend to 0.0.0-20260501152247-18b587758667 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

#### Summary No minimum length or entropy is enforced on the `JWT_SECRET` configuration value. The application accepts any base64-decodable secret regardless of size, including secrets as short as 1 byte. HS256 secrets below 32 bytes are brute-forceable offline, allowing attackers to recover the signing key and forge valid JWTs for arbitrary users. --- #### Impact An attacker who captures a single valid JWT (e.g, from cookies, logs, or network traffic) can: \> Crack the signing secret offline using brute-force or wordlist attacks \> Forge valid JWTs for any user ID (including administrat
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.