WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logsGHSA-q683-8468-r6h6
GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is a security vulnerability in web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle. A fix is available for web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundleReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator logs the full Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request object inside the log context of both onAuthenticationSuccess() and onAuthenticationFailure() at INFO level:
$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
'request' => $request,
'firewallName' => $firewallName,
'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);
$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
'request' => $request,
'exception' => $exception,
]);
Request::__toString() returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for LineFormatter, JsonFormatter via NormalizerFormatter, etc.), sensitive headers such as Cookie (session identifier), Authorization and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.
Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.
Affected versions
Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.
Patches
The fix removes the full Request object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.
Workarounds
Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:
- Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
- Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the
requestkey from the context of these records before they are written.
Credit
Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle | all versions | 5.3.4composer require web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle:^5.3.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle to 5.3.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.