GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6
WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs
Blast Radius
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Description
Impact
Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator logs the full Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request object inside the log context of both onAuthenticationSuccess() and onAuthenticationFailure() at INFO level:
$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
'request' => $request,
'firewallName' => $firewallName,
'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);
$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
'request' => $request,
'exception' => $exception,
]);
Request::__toString() returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for LineFormatter, JsonFormatter via NormalizerFormatter, etc.), sensitive headers such as Cookie (session identifier), Authorization and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.
Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.
Affected versions
Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.
Patches
The fix removes the full Request object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.
Workarounds
Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:
- Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
- Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the
requestkey from the context of these records before they are written.
Credit
Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle | all versions | 5.3.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle to 5.3.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.