GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Code Injection vulnerability in coreshop/core-shop. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
coreshop/core-shopReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/static.yml) uses the pull_request_target trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}). Subsequently, it executes a script (bin/console) from this untrusted checkout.
This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability.
Steps to Reproduce:
- Fork the target repository.
- In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the
pathscondition (e.g.,src/dummy.phporcomposer.json) to trigger the workflow. - Modify the
bin/consolefile (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== PWNED ==="
echo "whoami:"
whoami
- Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the
5.0ornextbranch of the base repository. - The
Static Testsworkflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for theValidate YAML(or any step executingbin/console). - You will see the output of
whoami(typicallyrunner), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context.
Impact:
Because pull_request_target runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., PIMCORE_SECRET, PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources.
Recommended Mitigation:
Do not checkout untrusted PR code (head.ref) when using pull_request_target if the code will be built or executed.
Consider adopting a separated architecture using the workflow_run event:
- Use the
pull_requestevent to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. - Use the
workflow_runevent (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | coreshop/core-shop | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for coreshop/core-shop, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of coreshop/core-shop has shipped for GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.