GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Code Injection vulnerability in coreshop/core-shop. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
coreshop/core-shopReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/static.yml) uses the pull_request_target trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}). Subsequently, it executes a script (bin/console) from this untrusted checkout.
This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability.
Steps to Reproduce:
- Fork the target repository.
- In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the
pathscondition (e.g.,src/dummy.phporcomposer.json) to trigger the workflow. - Modify the
bin/consolefile (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== PWNED ==="
echo "whoami:"
whoami
- Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the
5.0ornextbranch of the base repository. - The
Static Testsworkflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for theValidate YAML(or any step executingbin/console). - You will see the output of
whoami(typicallyrunner), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context.
Impact:
Because pull_request_target runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., PIMCORE_SECRET, PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources.
Recommended Mitigation:
Do not checkout untrusted PR code (head.ref) when using pull_request_target if the code will be built or executed.
Consider adopting a separated architecture using the workflow_run event:
- Use the
pull_requestevent to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. - Use the
workflow_runevent (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | coreshop/core-shop | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for coreshop/core-shop. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of coreshop/core-shop has shipped for GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.