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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-41249 — core-shop

HIGHFix: coreshop/CoreShop@cc1e3f5

CVE-2026-41249 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Code Injection vulnerability in coreshop/core-shop. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration

Also known asGHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41249.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs46th percentile — riskier than 46% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.40%0.80%1.20%0.4%0.5%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘coreshop/core-shop

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/static.yml) uses the pull_request_target trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}). Subsequently, it executes a script (bin/console) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability.

Steps to Reproduce:

  1. Fork the target repository.
  2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the paths condition (e.g., src/dummy.php or composer.json) to trigger the workflow.
  3. Modify the bin/console file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== PWNED ==="
echo "whoami:"
whoami
  1. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the 5.0 or next branch of the base repository.
  2. The Static Tests workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the Validate YAML (or any step executing bin/console).
  3. You will see the output of whoami (typically runner), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context.
<img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" />

Impact: Because pull_request_target runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., PIMCORE_SECRET, PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources.

Recommended Mitigation: Do not checkout untrusted PR code (head.ref) when using pull_request_target if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the workflow_run event:

  1. Use the pull_request event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts.
  2. Use the workflow_run event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistcoreshop/core-shopall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for coreshop/core-shop, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of coreshop/core-shop for CVE-2026-41249. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, m
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-41249: core-shop RCE (High 8.2)