sudo-rs doesn't record authenticating user properly in timestampGHSA-q428-6v73-fc4q
MEDIUMFix: trifectatechfoundation/sudo-rs@8423fd9GHSA-q428-6v73-fc4q is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.4) Improper Authentication vulnerability in sudo-rs. A fix is available for sudo-rs — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q428-6v73-fc4q.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
sudo-rsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When Defaults targetpw (or Defaults rootpw) is enabled, the password of the target account (or root account) instead of the invoking user is used for authentication. sudo-rs prior to 0.2.10 incorrectly recorded the invoking user’s UID instead of the authenticated-as user's UID in the authentication timestamp. Any later sudo invocation on the same terminal while the timestamp was still valid would use that timestamp, potentially bypassing new authentication even if the policy would have required it.
Impact
A highly-privileged user (able to run commands as other users, or as root, through sudo) who knows one password of an account they are allowed to run commands as, would be able to run commands as any other account the policy permits them to run commands for, even if they don't know the password for those accounts.
A common instance of this would be that a user can still use their own password to run commands as root (the default behaviour of sudo), effectively negating the intended behaviour of the targetpw or rootpw options.
Example
With this in /etc/sudoers:
Defaults targetpw
user ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
First run:
user@machine$ sudo -g root whoami
[sudo: authenticate] Password: <password for user>
user
Then run:
user@machine$ sudo -u root whoami
root
Affected versions
sudo-rs prior to 0.2.5 are not affected, since they do not offer Defaults targetpw or Defaults rootpw.
Credits
This issue was discovered and reported by @Pingasmaster.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | sudo-rs | ≥ 0.2.5&&< 0.2.10 | 0.2.10cargo update -p sudo-rs --precise 0.2.10 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sudo-rs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update sudo-rs to 0.2.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q428-6v73-fc4q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q428-6v73-fc4q in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.