How severe is GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf?

GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf has a CVSS score of 7.2/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf?

GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf affects the following packages: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf?

Update phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 3.2.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf actively exploited in the wild?

Yes. There are 1 known exploit references for GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf, including 1 in-the-wild exploitation observed on GitHub and other sources. Treat this as actively exploitable and prioritize patching immediately. All exploit code should only be run in an isolated sandbox environment for research or authorized testing — never against production systems without explicit written authorization.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf?

GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 1.5%, placing it in the 71th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf?

GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf is classified as Unrestricted File Upload (CWE-434). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf was published on March 25, 2024 and was last updated on March 25, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf

HIGH

phpMyFAQ's File Upload Bypass at Category Image Leads to RCE

Also known asCVE-2024-28105

Published

Mar 25, 2024

Updated

Mar 25, 2024

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

1.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk71th percentile-1.61%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The category image upload function in phpmyfaq is vulnerable to manipulation of the Content-type and lang parameters, allowing attackers to upload malicious files with a .php extension, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) on the system.

Details

In the file upload function of the category image, the Content-type can be manipulated to return an empty string for the extension and the lang parameter can be set to .php. to allow an attacker to save a file as .PHP. This allows the uploading of web shells which could lead to RCE on phpmyfaq.

PoC

Generate a fake .GIF file that contains a php command using the tool gifsicle a. Cmd: gifsicle < test1.gif --comment "<?php system('whoami'); ?>" > output.php.gif

b. The contents of the file should look like this:
Browse to “../phpmyfaq/admin/?action=addcategory” and upload the fake .GIF file
Intercept the upload request and modify the params below and forward it: 3a. lang parameter to .php. 3b. Content-Type parameter from image/gif to image/gif2
Browse to the “/phpmyfaq/images” directory and notice that our fake .GIF file has been uploaded as a PHP file with the category number as its filename.
Now we just need to browse to “../phpmyfaq/images/category-<ID>-.php” and see the results of our whoami command. Hence, verifying that RCE is achieved.

Impact

Attackers can upload malicious files containing executable code, allowing them to take control of the vulnerable system. This enables them to execute arbitrary commands, steal sensitive data, disrupt services, and potentially escalate their privileges, posing significant risks to the security and integrity of the system and its data.

Occurrences

In CategoryImage.php line 124, the getimagesize and isValidMimeType functions can be bypassed by uploading a fake .GIF file generated by gifsicle.

In CategoryImage.php line 85, the getFileExtension function returns an empty string when the content type doesnt match any of the following 3 mappings. Hence, its possible to just supply an invalid content type such as image/gif2 in step 3 of the PoC to make the function return an empty string.

In CategoryImage.php line 66, the getFileName function generate the filename by concatenating the categoryId, categoryName and fileExtension together. This allows us to save the file with a .PHP extension. (It should be possible to just set the payload in step 3 above to just .php but it doesnt work and im not sure why..)

Suggested Fix

I believe one of the ways to solve this vulnerability is by forcing the getFileExtension function to return one of the 3 mimetype instead of an empty string. This ensures that the uploaded file will have an image extension and will not execute as a PHP file.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq`	≥ 3.2.5&&< 3.2.6	3.2.6

Exploits & PoCs

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, P…

github.comNVDJan 2025

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 3.2.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The category image upload function in phpmyfaq is vulnerable to manipulation of the `Content-type` and `lang` parameters, allowing attackers to upload malicious files with a .php extension, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) on the system. ### Details In the file upload function of the category image, the `Content-type` can be manipulated to return an empty string for the extension and the `lang` parameter can be set to `.php.` to allow an attacker to save a file as `.PHP`. This allows the uploading of web shells which could lead to RCE on phpmyfaq. ### PoC 1. Gen

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-pwh2-fpfr-x5gf across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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