GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 — spree_storefront
Fix: spree/spree@3e00be6GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 is a CWE-639 vulnerability in spree_storefront. A fix is available for spree_storefront — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Unauthenticated Spree Commerce users can view completed guest orders by Order ID
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
spree_storefront💎spree_storefront💎spree_storefront💎spree_storefrontReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Unauthenticated users can view completed guest orders by Order ID (GHSL-2026-029)
The OrdersController#show action permits viewing completed guest orders by order number alone, without requiring the associated order token.
Order lookup without enforcing token requirement in OrdersController#show:
@order = complete_order_finder.new(number: params[:id], token: params[:token], store: current_store).execute.first
Authorization bypass for guest orders in authorize_access:
def authorize_access
return true if @order.user_id.nil?
@order.user == try_spree_current_user
end
If the attacker is in possession of a leaked Order ID, they might look it up directly via this API. Alternatively, brute forcing all or parts of the possible Order IDs might be feasible for an attacker. (The Order IDs themselves are securely generated, but with relatively low entropy: by default an order ID has a length of 9 and a base of 10, that would require an attacker to perform 1 billion requests to gather all guest orders. (At an assumed constant rate of 100 requests per second it would take 115 days.)
Proof of Concept
- As a guest create a complete order.
- Fetch the latest Order ID from the database (Table:
spree_orders). - In another clean browser access following URL:
<SPREE-HOST>/orders/<ORDER-ID>. (Sample:http://localhost:3000/orders/R496592563)
=> Full guest order details are disclosed including names, addresses and limited payment info.
Impact
This issue may lead to disclosure of PII of guest users (including names, addresses and phone numbers).
CWEs
- CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Credit
This issue was discovered with the GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent and manually verified by GHSL team members @p- (Peter Stöckli) and @m-y-mo (Man Yue Mo).
Disclosure Policy
This report is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline, as described in more detail in our coordinated disclosure policy.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | spree_storefront | all versions | 5.0.8bundle update spree_storefront --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree_storefront | ≥ 5.1.0&&< 5.1.10 | 5.1.10bundle update spree_storefront --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree_storefront | ≥ 5.2.0&&< 5.2.7 | 5.2.7bundle update spree_storefront --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree_storefront | ≥ 5.3.0&&< 5.3.2 | 5.3.2bundle update spree_storefront --conservative |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for spree_storefront, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update spree_storefront to 5.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 across RubyGems dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.