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GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9

Unauthenticated Spree Commerce users can view completed guest orders by Order ID

Also known asCVE-2026-25757
Published
Feb 5, 2026
Updated
Feb 13, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk35th percentile+0.41%
0.00%0.31%0.63%0.94%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
💎spree_storefront💎spree_storefront💎spree_storefront💎spree_storefront

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Unauthenticated users can view completed guest orders by Order ID (GHSL-2026-029)

The OrdersController#show action permits viewing completed guest orders by order number alone, without requiring the associated order token.

Order lookup without enforcing token requirement in OrdersController#show:

@order = complete_order_finder.new(number: params[:id], token: params[:token], store: current_store).execute.first

Authorization bypass for guest orders in authorize_access:

def authorize_access
  return true if @order.user_id.nil?

  @order.user == try_spree_current_user
end

If the attacker is in possession of a leaked Order ID, they might look it up directly via this API. Alternatively, brute forcing all or parts of the possible Order IDs might be feasible for an attacker. (The Order IDs themselves are securely generated, but with relatively low entropy: by default an order ID has a length of 9 and a base of 10, that would require an attacker to perform 1 billion requests to gather all guest orders. (At an assumed constant rate of 100 requests per second it would take 115 days.)

Proof of Concept

  1. As a guest create a complete order.
  2. Fetch the latest Order ID from the database (Table: spree_orders).
  3. In another clean browser access following URL: <SPREE-HOST>/orders/<ORDER-ID>. (Sample: http://localhost:3000/orders/R496592563)

=> Full guest order details are disclosed including names, addresses and limited payment info.

Impact

This issue may lead to disclosure of PII of guest users (including names, addresses and phone numbers).

CWEs

  • CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Credit

This issue was discovered with the GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent and manually verified by GHSL team members @p- (Peter Stöckli) and @m-y-mo (Man Yue Mo).

Disclosure Policy

This report is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline, as described in more detail in our coordinated disclosure policy.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsspree_storefrontall versions5.0.8
💎RubyGemsspree_storefront5.1.0&&< 5.1.105.1.10
💎RubyGemsspree_storefront5.2.0&&< 5.2.75.2.7
💎RubyGemsspree_storefront5.3.0&&< 5.3.25.3.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for spree_storefront. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update spree_storefront to 5.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Unauthenticated users can view completed guest orders by Order ID (`GHSL-2026-029`) The `OrdersController#show` action permits viewing completed guest orders by order number alone, without requiring the associated order token. Order lookup without enforcing token requirement in [`OrdersController#show`](https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/1341623f2ae92685cdbe232885bf5808fc8f9ca8/storefront/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb#L14): ```ruby @order = complete_order_finder.new(number: params[:id], token: params[:token], store: current_store).execute.first ``` Authorization bypass fo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9 across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9: spree_storefront | O3 Security