GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Note Mark has Broken Access Control on Asset Download
Real-World Exposure
github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backendReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A broken access control vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to retrieve note assets directly from the asset download endpoint when they know both the note UUID and asset UUID. This exposes the full contents of private note assets without authentication, even when the associated book is not public.
Details
The issue is caused by the asset download route being registered without authentication middleware.
Relevant route registration:
handlers/assets.go, line 40
huma.Get(api, "/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}", h.GetNoteAssetContentByID)
By contrast, other asset operations correctly apply authentication middleware. For example:
huma.Delete(api, "/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}", h.DeleteNoteAsset,
huma.WithMiddleware(h.authMiddleware.AuthRequiredMiddleware))
The backend service for asset retrieval also does not enforce ownership or visibility checks. According to the provided code references, the lookup only queries the asset table by asset ID and note ID:
SELECT * FROM note_assets WHERE id = ? AND note_id = ?
Because the retrieval path does not join against the related notes or books records, it does not verify:
- whether the requester owns the parent book
- whether the parent book is public or private
- whether the related note has been deleted
As a result, possession of a valid noteID and assetID is sufficient to retrieve the asset binary, regardless of whether the note belongs to a private book.
The exploitability is constrained by identifier knowledge. Both noteID and assetID are UUIDv4 values, so blind guessing is impractical. However, the endpoint remains vulnerable whenever those identifiers are disclosed through another channel, such as leaked links, browser history, proxy logs, shared URLs, or other application behaviors that expose internal asset references.
PoC
The issue can be reproduced by creating a private note with an attached asset, then requesting the asset download endpoint without authentication using the valid noteID and assetID. The server returns the asset content even though the associated note is private.
Impact
- Type: Broken access control / unauthenticated information disclosure
- Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the affected asset download endpoint
- Security impact: Full binary contents of private note assets can be disclosed to unauthenticated users who know the required identifiers
- Attack preconditions: The attacker must know both the target
noteIDandassetID; no authentication is required - Attack complexity: High, because successful exploitation depends on prior disclosure of both UUIDs rather than feasible online guessing
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend | all versions | 0.0.0-20260411145023-6593898855ad |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend to 0.0.0-20260411145023-6593898855ad or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.