gix's submodule name validation bypass + trust inheritance flaw enables path traversal and credential disclosureGHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w

Summary

Submodule name validation bypass plus missing validation in production code paths allows path traversal via crafted .gitmodules. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), this enables reading arbitrary git repository configs (including credentials) from traversed paths with full trust (CWE-22, CWE-200).

Details

Bug 1: Validation bypass in gix-validate/src/submodule.rs (lines 27-42)

The name() function uses name.find(b"..") which returns only the FIRST occurrence. If the first .. is embedded in a non-traversal context, the function returns Ok without checking subsequent ../ sequences:

pub fn name(name: &BStr) -> Result<&BStr, name::Error> {
    match name.find(b"..") {
        Some(pos) => {
            let &b = name.get(pos + 2).ok_or(name::Error::ParentComponent)?;
            if b == b'/' || b == b'\\' {
                Err(name::Error::ParentComponent)
            } else {
                Ok(name)  // Returns Ok without checking rest of string
            }
        }
        None => Ok(name),
    }
}

Bypass: a..b/../../../.git/ passes because find(b"..") returns position 1 (the .. in a..b), checks name[3] == b'b', and returns Ok. The real /../../../ is never checked.

Bug 2: Validation never called in production

gix_validate::submodule::name() has zero production callers (only test code). The names() iterator in gix-submodule/src/access.rs:29 explicitly documents it returns "unvalidated names."

git_dir() at gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:198-204 constructs filesystem paths from raw names:

pub fn git_dir(&self) -> PathBuf {
    self.state.repo.common_dir().join("modules").join(gix_path::from_bstr(self.name()))
}

Bug 3: Trust inheritance bypass in Submodule::open()

At gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:270, open() clones the parent repository's options:

match crate::open_opts(self.git_dir_try_old_form()?, self.state.repo.options.clone()) {

The parent's options.git_dir_trust is Some(Trust::Full). At gix/src/open/repository.rs:103-104:

if options.git_dir_trust.is_none() {
    options.git_dir_trust = gix_sec::Trust::from_path_ownership(&git_dir)?.into();
}

Since trust is already Some(Full), the ownership check is skipped entirely. The traversed path is opened with Trust::Full regardless of ownership, bypassing gitoxide's safe-directory protections.

PoC

Compiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 --release mode. All bypass cases confirmed:

BYPASS a..b/../../../.git/           -> PASSED validation
       git_dir = .git/modules/a..b/../../../.git/
       normalized = .git/              (parent repo!)

BYPASS x..y/../../../.git/config     -> PASSED validation
       git_dir = .git/modules/x..y/../../../.git/config
       normalized = .git/config

Attack chain

1. Attacker crafts a repository with .gitmodules:

   [submodule "x..y/../../.."]
       path = innocent
       url = https://attacker.com/repo.git
   

2. Victim clones the repository using a tool built on gitoxide.

3. When the tool iterates submodules and calls submodule.open() or submodule.status():

   • git_dir() returns .git/modules/x..y/../../.. which resolves to the parent .git/
   • open_opts() is called with Trust::Full (inherited from parent, ownership check skipped)
   • The parent's .git/config is fully parsed

4. The returned Repository object exposes all config values from the traversed path:

   • remote.origin.url (may contain https://user:[email protected]/...)
   • http.extraHeader (often Authorization: Bearer <token>)
   • credential.* sections
   • core.sshCommand

5. Accessible via standard API: repo.config_snapshot().string("http.extraHeader"), repo.find_remote("origin"), etc.

Impact

A crafted .gitmodules in a malicious repository causes gitoxide to open arbitrary git directories as submodule repositories with full trust, exposing their configuration including credentials. This is the same class of vulnerability as GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c (path traversal), but through the submodule name vector with an additional trust bypass.

The trust inheritance is the critical amplifier: without it, the traversed path would undergo ownership checks that could block the attack. With it, any git directory reachable via ../ is opened with full trust.

Honest limitations

• The traversed path must be a valid git directory (HEAD, objects/, refs/ must exist)
• The victim's tool must call open() or status() on submodules (tools that only list submodules are not affected)
• Credential exposure requires the target config to contain embedded credentials
• Submodule operations currently require explicit user action

Suggested fix

1. Fix the validation to check ALL .. occurrences (iterate, not single find)
2. Call gix_validate::submodule::name() in git_dir() before constructing the path
3. Do NOT inherit git_dir_trust from parent when opening submodule repos -- always re-derive trust from path ownership

Severity

High. Network vector (via clone), requires user interaction (submodule operations). The trust bypass enables credential disclosure from traversed git directories. Confidentiality impact is high.