What is GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

## **Summary** attachments: [pocs.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26431422/pocs.zip) Submodule names coming from `.gitmodules` are exposed as unvalidated names and are later reused to derive the submodule git directory as: ``` /modules/ ``` Because the submodule name is joined directly as a filesystem path component, a name such as `../../../escaped-target.git` escapes `.git/modules` after normalization. The current implementation then uses that escaped path in both `state()` and `open()`. The updated PoC demonstrates the real sink, n

How severe is GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h affects the following packages: gitoxide (crates.io), gix (crates.io). Ecosystems affected: crates.io.

How do I fix GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

Update gitoxide to 0.52.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h in my crates.io dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitoxide, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Is GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.4%, placing it in the 33th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h?

GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h is classified as Path Traversal (CWE-22). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h was published on May 5, 2026 and was last updated on September 10, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🦀 crates.io

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h — gitoxide

GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h is a Path Traversal vulnerability in gitoxide. A fix is available for gitoxide — see the affected versions and patch details below.

gix and gitoxide: unvalidated submodule name traverses out of .git/modules and redirects state() / open() to another repository

Also known asCVE-2026-82251

Published

May 5, 2026

Updated

Sep 10, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs33th percentile — riskier than 33% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

🦀gitoxide🦀gix

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

attachments: pocs.zip

Submodule names coming from .gitmodules are exposed as unvalidated names and are later reused to derive the submodule git directory as:

<superproject common_dir>/modules/<submodule name>

Because the submodule name is joined directly as a filesystem path component, a name such as ../../../escaped-target.git escapes .git/modules after normalization. The current implementation then uses that escaped path in both state() and open().

The updated PoC demonstrates the real sink, not just string construction:

state() reports repository_exists=true for the traversed path;
open() returns a repository whose normalized common_dir() matches the attacker-chosen repository outside .git/modules.

Root cause analysis

The relevant flow is:

gix-submodule/src/access.rs exposes unvalidated submodule names from configuration.
gix/src/submodule/mod.rs derives the git directory by doing common_dir().join("modules").join(name) with no confinement check.
gix/src/submodule/mod.rs uses that derived path during state resolution and repository opening.

There is no normalization-and-confinement step between “submodule name from configuration” and “filesystem path used for repository existence checks / open.” As a result, traversal segments in the submodule name directly influence which repository path is inspected and opened.

Reproduce steps

Use the attached PoC zip that contains the pocs/ workspace.

Unzip the PoC archive.
Enter pocs/F002.
Run:
```
cargo run --quiet
```
Compare the output with pocs/F002/result.txt.

Key outputs are:

submodule_name=../../../escaped-target.git
derived_git_dir_raw=.../.git/modules/../../../escaped-target.git
derived_git_dir_normalized=.../artifacts/escaped-target.git
escaped_target=.../artifacts/escaped-target.git
repository_exists=true
submodule_opened=true
opened_common_dir_normalized=.../artifacts/escaped-target.git
normalized_git_dir_matches_target=true
opened_common_dir_matches_target=true
target_outside_modules_root=true

These outputs show that gitoxide is not only constructing a traversable path string. It is actually using the escaped path for repository existence checks and for opening a repository object.

Impact

Confirmed impact:

a malicious submodule name can redirect submodule state inspection away from .git/modules/<name> to an attacker-chosen repository path outside .git/modules;
Submodule::state() can report repository existence for the wrong repository;
Submodule::open() can return a repository object backed by that attacker-chosen path.

This is best described as a path-traversal / repository-confusion issue in submodule repository resolution.

This report does not claim command execution from this behavior alone. The demonstrated impact is repository redirection: callers that enumerate, inspect, or operate on submodules can be steered into using the wrong repository.

Recommended fix

Two complementary fixes are advisable:

do not reuse raw submodule names as filesystem path fragments;
- either use a validated/sanitized name for filesystem derivation,
- or derive the storage path from a safe identifier instead of the user-controlled name;
add an explicit confinement check after path derivation;
- normalize or canonicalize the candidate path,
- verify that the result stays under <common_dir>/modules,
- reject names that contain traversal segments, path separators, or any representation that can escape the modules root.

In short, submodule names may remain opaque configuration identifiers, but they should not be treated as trusted filesystem subpaths.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🦀crates.io	`gitoxide`	all versions	0.52.1`cargo update -p gitoxide --precise 0.52.1`
🦀crates.io	`gix`	all versions	0.83.0`cargo update -p gix --precise 0.83.0`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitoxide, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update gitoxide to 0.52.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## **Summary** attachments: [pocs.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26431422/pocs.zip) Submodule names coming from `.gitmodules` are exposed as unvalidated names and are later reused to derive the submodule git directory as: ``` <superproject common_dir>/modules/<submodule name> ``` Because the submodule name is joined directly as a filesystem path component, a name such as `../../../escaped-target.git` escapes `.git/modules` after normalization. The current implementation then uses that escaped path in both `state()` and `open()`. The updated PoC demonstrates the real sink, n

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h across crates.io dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works