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October: Media Library Crop Handler Bypasses Upload Extension AllowlistGHSA-mqwx-84vv-mp26

MEDIUMFix: octobercms/october@118c3d0

GHSA-mqwx-84vv-mp26 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.5) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in october/october. A fix is available for october/october — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-63193
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
1 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs47th percentile — riskier than 47% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐘october/october🐘october/october

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The Media Library upload handler validates the destination filename against an extension allowlist (default_extensions), rejecting types such as php, phtml, html, and htm. The image crop handler (MediaManager::onCropImage / cropImage) did not perform this check. The destination filename was taken from user input, the extension was extracted from it, and the staged bytes were written to the public media folder under that attacker-chosen extension. Combined with the fact that upload accepts any file contents under an allowlisted extension (a PHP payload disguised as .jpg), and that the zero-dimension crop branch performs a byte-for-byte File::copy rather than re-encoding the pixels, an authenticated backend user with the media.library.create permission could write a file with arbitrary extension and arbitrary contents into the public media folder.

Scope of impact depends on web server configuration. On a default October CMS install (using the shipped Apache .htaccess or nginx.conf), PHP execution from the media folder is blocked, so the realistic outcome is stored XSS via .html or .svg files served from the application origin. On a server that is configured to execute PHP inside the media directory (a non-default but real-world misconfiguration), the same bug becomes remote code execution.

Impact

  • Bypass of the Media Library extension allowlist that the upload path enforces
  • Stored XSS on default installs: attacker can write .html or .svg files served from the application origin, executing script in the browser of any backend user or visitor who opens the file
  • SVG sanitizer bypass: the Html::cleanVector step only runs on the upload path, so uploading malicious SVG content as a .jpg and then cropping it to .svg skips the sanitizer entirely
  • Remote code execution on deployments that execute PHP inside the media folder (non-default)
  • Requires authenticated backend access with the media.library.create permission

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in v3.7.18 and v4.3.3. The crop handler now applies the same extension allowlist check as the upload handler before staging the output file. As defense in depth, the central MediaLibrary::put and MediaLibrary::putFile write methods now validate the destination extension as well, so any future write path that goes through the library inherits the check. All users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched version.

Workarounds

If upgrading immediately is not possible:

  • Restrict the media.library.create permission to fully trusted backend users only
  • Ensure the web server cannot execute PHP from the media storage directory (the shipped .htaccess and nginx.conf already enforce this)

References

  • Reported by nova-aryan

Affected Packages

2 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistoctober/octoberall versionsNo fix
🐘Packagistoctober/october≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.3.24.3.2composer require october/october:^4.3.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for october/october, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    A fix is available for GHSA-mqwx-84vv-mp26; check the affected-versions list above or the advisory for the patched release of october/october, then make sure no transitive dependency still pins the vulnerable range.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

The Media Library upload handler validates the destination filename against an extension allowlist (`default_extensions`), rejecting types such as `php`, `phtml`, `html`, and `htm`. The image crop handler (`MediaManager::onCropImage` / `cropImage`) did not perform this check. The destination filename was taken from user input, the extension was extracted from it, and the staged bytes were written to the public media folder under that attacker-chosen extension. Combined with the fact that upload accepts any file contents under an allowlisted extension (a PHP payload disguised as `.jpg`), and th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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