October CMS: Incomplete Scheme Validation in Image ResizerGHSA-2xmm-m4wv-3fjh
LOWGHSA-2xmm-m4wv-3fjh is a low-severity (CVSS 3.9) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in october/october. A fix is available for october/october — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2xmm-m4wv-3fjh.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-2xmm-m4wv-3fjh by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 397,508 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
october/octoberReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
The image resizer classified external sources by testing whether the source string began with the substring http, and the string-source branch in ResizeImageItem::fromObject() accepted any value containing :// as a URL. As a result, non-http(s) PHP stream wrappers such as phar://, file:// and ftp:// could be stored in the resizer cache and later passed to the underlying image library. On a phar:// path this can lead to metadata deserialization during subsequent file operations.
Exploitation requires an existing template-authoring or backend-configuration primitive that passes untrusted input into the |resize Twig filter (or the ResizeImages::resize() API). The /resize/{file} route itself is a lookup against a cache entry that was previously written by trusted server-side code, and an unauthenticated visitor cannot cause an arbitrary source path to be written into that cache. In October's trust model the Publisher and Developer backend roles that can author templates are already trusted with template code execution, so this is a defense-in-depth hardening rather than an unauthenticated network-to-RCE path.
Impact
- On installations where a template author has piped untrusted input into
|resizewithout validation, aphar://source could reach the resizer and trigger metadata deserialization - No exposure on default templates or on installations where
|resizeis only applied to trusted values (uploaded file models, theme assets, static URLs) - Hardening; not exploitable from the network without a pre-existing injection primitive on the calling code
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in v4.3.5.
Workarounds
If upgrading immediately is not possible:
- Audit template code and backend widget configuration for uses of the
|resizefilter (or directResizeImages::resize()calls) that accept untrusted string input, and validate the scheme ishttp/httpsbefore passing it in
References
- Reported by 0xGenesi
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | october/october | ≥ 4.3.0&&< 4.3.5 | 4.3.5composer require october/october:^4.3.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for october/october, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update october/october to 4.3.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2xmm-m4wv-3fjh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2xmm-m4wv-3fjh in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.