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HIGH severity

Observability Operator is vulnerable to Incorrect Privilege Assignment through its Custom Resource MonitorStackGHSA-mj6p-p843-x5wc

HIGHFix: rhobs/observability-operator@98b927f

GHSA-mj6p-p843-x5wc is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-266 vulnerability in github.com/rhobs/observability-operator. A fix is available for github.com/rhobs/observability-operator — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2025-2843GO-2025-4125
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mj6p-p843-x5wc.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs29th percentile — riskier than 29% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.28%0.57%0.85%0.1%0.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/rhobs/observability-operator

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

A flaw was found in the Observability Operator. The Operator creates a ServiceAccount with ClusterRole upon deployment of the Namespace-Scoped Custom Resource MonitorStack. This issue allows an adversarial Kubernetes Account with only namespaced-level roles, for example, a tenant controlling a namespace, to create a MonitorStack in the authorized namespace and then elevate permission to the cluster level by impersonating the ServiceAccount created by the Operator, resulting in privilege escalation and other issues.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/rhobs/observability-operatorall versions1.3.0go get github.com/rhobs/observability-operator@v1.3.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/rhobs/observability-operator, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/rhobs/observability-operator to 1.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mj6p-p843-x5wc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

Red Hat rates this with an Important impact. Although the attacker may use a previously privileged account, the escalation may lead to broader cluster access.

ProductFixed inAdvisory
Cluster Observability Operator 1.3.1cluster-observability-operator/cluster-observability-rhel9-operator:1.3.0-1762825457RHSA-2025:21146

Frequently Asked Questions

A flaw was found in the Observability Operator. The Operator creates a ServiceAccount with *ClusterRole* upon deployment of the *Namespace-Scoped* Custom Resource MonitorStack. This issue allows an adversarial Kubernetes Account with only namespaced-level roles, for example, a tenant controlling a namespace, to create a MonitorStack in the authorized namespace and then elevate permission to the cluster level by impersonating the ServiceAccount created by the Operator, resulting in privilege escalation and other issues.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Observability Operator is vulnerable to Incorrect Privilege…