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Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv is a Improper Authentication vulnerability in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library's `CookieStore` replaces explicitly defined `Cookie`s

Also known asCVE-2024-53990
Published
Dec 2, 2024
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Feb 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-clientorg.asynchttpclient:async-http-client

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When making any HTTP request, the automatically enabled and self-managed CookieStore (aka cookie jar) will silently replace explicitly defined Cookies with any that have the same name from the cookie jar. For services that operate with multiple users, this can result in one user's Cookie being used for another user's requests.

Details

This issue is described without security warnings here:

https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964

A PR to fix this issue has been made:

https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033

PoC

  1. Add an auth Cookie to the CookieStore
    • This is identical to receiving an HTTP response that uses Set-Cookie, as shown in issue #1964 above.
  2. Handle a different user's request where the same Cookie is provided as a passthrough, like a JWT, and attempt to use it by explicitly providing it.
  3. Observe that the user's cookie in step 2 is passed as the Cookie in step 1.

Impact

This is generally going to be a problem for developers of backend services that implement third party auth features and use other features like token refresh. The moment a third party service responds by setting a cookie in the response, the CookieStore will effectively break almost every follow-up request (hopefully by being rejected, but possibly by revealing a different user's information).

If your service sets cookies based on the response that happens here, it's possible to lead to even greater levels of exposure.

Workaroud

You can avoid this issue by disabling the CookieStore during client creation:

DefaultAsyncHttpClientConfig.Builder clientBuilder = Dsl.config()
 .setCookieStore(null)
 // other configuration
 ;

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.asynchttpclient:async-http-client2.1.0&&< 2.12.42.12.4
Mavenorg.asynchttpclient:async-http-client3.0.0.Beta1&&< 3.0.13.0.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to 2.12.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When making any HTTP request, the automatically enabled and self-managed `CookieStore` (aka cookie jar) will silently replace explicitly defined `Cookie`s with any that have the same name from the cookie jar. For services that operate with multiple users, this can result in one user's `Cookie` being used for another user's requests. ### Details This issue is described without security warnings here: https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964 A PR to fix this issue has been made: https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033 ### PoC 1.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv: async-http-client | O3 Security