browse-mcp has an arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state pathsGHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p
Fix: That1Drifter/browse-mcp#58GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p is a Path Traversal vulnerability in browse-mcp. A fix is available for browse-mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
browse-mcpnpmDescription
Impact
browser_download wrote a fetched file to join(save_dir, filename) with no validation of save_dir, and browser_save_state / browser_load_state honored an explicit path unchanged. The MCP caller controls these arguments (a malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page), so an attacker could supply an arbitrary save_dir (or state path) together with a URL whose response body became the file contents, writing attacker-controlled bytes to any path the process can reach (for example ~/.bashrc, an autostart entry, or a cron file). That is an arbitrary file write that can lead to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback additionally used a raw fetch() that bypassed the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence.
Estimated severity: CVSS 3.1 around 7.8 (High) for the local / agent-mediated case.
Patches
Fixed in 0.8.2. save_dir is confined under the download root (~/.browse-mcp/downloads) and the explicit state path under ~/.browse-mcp/state; absolute paths and .. escapes are rejected, and download filenames are reduced to a bare basename. force_fetch now also honors the origin fence. Data roots remain relocatable via BROWSE_MCP_HOME. Upgrade to browse-mcp 0.8.2.
Workarounds
Restrict the exposed tools with BROWSE_MCP_TOOLS to a set that excludes browser_download, browser_save_state, and browser_load_state (for example the hardened recipe in SECURITY.md). Note that the allowlist hides the tools from an agent but does not stop a malicious MCP client from calling them by name, so upgrading is the real fix.
- Reported privately by novice-22.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | browse-mcp | all versions | 0.8.2npm install browse-mcp@0.8.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for browse-mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update browse-mcp to 0.8.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.