How severe is GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7?

GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 affects the following packages: github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v13 (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7?

No patched version of github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting has shipped for GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

How do I detect GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7?

O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Is GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 was published on April 17, 2024 and was last updated on June 10, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 — vesting

GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 is a security vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

Evmos vulnerable to unauthorized account creation with vesting module

Also known asGO-2024-2731

Published

Apr 17, 2024

Updated

Jun 10, 2024

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

None yet

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Jun 10, 2024 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

Using the vesting module, a malicious attacker can create a new vesting account at a given address, before a contract is created on that address.

Addresses of smart contracts deployed to the EVM are deterministic. Therefore, it would be possible for an attacker to front-run a contract creation and create a vesting account at that address. When an address has been initialized without any contract code deployed to it, it will not be possible to upload any afterwards. In the described attack, this would mean that a malicious actor could prevent smart contracts from being deployed correctly.

In order to remediate this, an alternative user flow is being implemented for the vesting module:

only the account receiving the vesting funds will be able to create such an account by calling the CreateClawbackVestingAccount method and defining a funder address
vesting and lockup periods can then be created by that funder address using FundClawbackAccount

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Affected Packages

2 total

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting`	all versions	No fix
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v13`	all versions	No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting has shipped for GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Using the vesting module, a malicious attacker can create a new vesting account at a given address, before a contract is created on that address. Addresses of smart contracts deployed to the EVM are deterministic. Therefore, it would be possible for an attacker to front-run a contract creation and create a vesting account at that address. When an address has been initialized without any contract code deployed to it, it will not be possible to upload any afterwards. In the described attack, this would mean that a malicious actor

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works