GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p — nocodb
LOWGHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p is a low-severity (CVSS 2) CWE-863 vulnerability in nocodb. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 382,205 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
nocodbnpmDescription
Summary
The OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id.
Details
In packages/nocodb/src/strategies/oauth-token.strategy.ts, the strategy set is_oauth_token, oauth_client_id, oauth_granted_resources, and oauth_scope on the user object, then mapped through to the user's existing roles / base_roles. The ACL middleware in extract-ids.middleware.ts honoured is_api_token via blockApiTokenAccess but had no equivalent gate for is_oauth_token or scope-string enforcement.
The base/workspace restriction logic short-circuited when req.context.base_id was unset (org-level routes), so an OAuth token scoped to one base could still call org-level endpoints as the underlying user.
The fix adds a path-prefix allowlist (['/mcp', '/api/v3/', '/auth/user/me']) enforced inside the strategy and a blockOAuthTokenAccess ACL flag for endpoints that should never accept OAuth tokens.
Impact
- Scope escalation: tokens issued with a narrow scope received the underlying user's full role.
- Resource boundary bypass: per-base restrictions did not apply to org-level routes.
- Violates least-privilege expectation for third-party OAuth integrations.
Credit
This issue was reported by @ik0z.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | nocodb | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nocodb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of nocodb has shipped for GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.