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LOW severity

GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p

LOW

GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p is a low-severity (CVSS 2) CWE-863 vulnerability in nocodb. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation

Also known asCVE-2026-46549
Published
May 21, 2026
Updated
Jul 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs5th percentile — riskier than 5% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.22%0.43%0.65%0.2%0.2%0.2%Jul 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 360,781 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
nocodbnpm
3Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

The OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id.

Details

In packages/nocodb/src/strategies/oauth-token.strategy.ts, the strategy set is_oauth_token, oauth_client_id, oauth_granted_resources, and oauth_scope on the user object, then mapped through to the user's existing roles / base_roles. The ACL middleware in extract-ids.middleware.ts honoured is_api_token via blockApiTokenAccess but had no equivalent gate for is_oauth_token or scope-string enforcement.

The base/workspace restriction logic short-circuited when req.context.base_id was unset (org-level routes), so an OAuth token scoped to one base could still call org-level endpoints as the underlying user.

The fix adds a path-prefix allowlist (['/mcp', '/api/v3/', '/auth/user/me']) enforced inside the strategy and a blockOAuthTokenAccess ACL flag for endpoints that should never accept OAuth tokens.

Impact

  • Scope escalation: tokens issued with a narrow scope received the underlying user's full role.
  • Resource boundary bypass: per-base restrictions did not apply to org-level routes.
  • Violates least-privilege expectation for third-party OAuth integrations.

Credit

This issue was reported by @ik0z.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmnocodball versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nocodb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of nocodb has shipped for GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The OAuth token strategy attached `oauth_scope` and `oauth_granted_resources` to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the `granted_resources.base_id` restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate `req.context.base_id`. ### Details In `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/oauth-token.strategy.ts`, the strategy set `is_oauth_token`, `oauth_client_id`, `oauth_granted_resources`, and `oauth_scope`
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.