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Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26 — v4

Fix: authelia/authelia@d4a5418

GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26 is a CWE-307 vulnerability in github.com/authelia/authelia/v4. A fix is available for github.com/authelia/authelia/v4 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Authelia applies regulation separately to Username-based logins to Email-based logins

Also known asCVE-2025-24806GO-2025-3468
Published
Feb 19, 2025
Updated
Mar 3, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/authelia/authelia/v4

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Authelia is an open-source authentication and authorization server providing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) for applications via a web portal. If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This makes it a bit easier to brute-force a password. A patch for this issue has been applied to versions 4.38.19, and 4.39.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should 1. Not heavily modify the default settings in a way that ends up with shorter or less frequent regulation bans. The default settings effectively mitigate any potential for this issue to be exploited. and 2. Disable the ability for users to login via an email address.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/authelia/authelia/v4all versions4.38.19go get github.com/authelia/authelia/v4@v4.38.19

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/authelia/authelia/v4, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/authelia/authelia/v4 to 4.38.19 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-m5mf-3963-4x26 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.