GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc
MEDIUMthorsten/phpmyfaq Unintended File Download Triggered by Embedded Frames
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
thorsten/phpmyfaqReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A vulnerability exists in the FAQ Record component where a privileged attacker can trigger a file download on a victim's machine upon page visit by embedding it in an <iframe> element without user interaction or explicit consent.
Details
In http://localhost/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en, where a FAQ record is either created or edited, an attacker can insert an iframe, as "source code", pointing to a prior "malicious" attachment that the attacker has uploaded via FAQ "new attachment" upload, such that any page visits to this FAQ will trigger an automated download (from the edit screen, download is automated; from the faq page view as a normal user, depending on the browser, a pop up confirmation may be presented before the actual download. Firebox browser, for instance, does not require any interactions).
PoC
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create a new FAQ record and upload a "malicious" file - in my case, I uploaded an eicar file. take note of the uri, ie <p><iframe "index.php?action=attachment&id=2"
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in the FAQ record, insert a "source code" blob using the "< >" button
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insert in the following snippet: <p><iframe src="index.php?action=attachment&id=2"></iframe></p> and save FAQ record
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once the edit page reloads, the malicious code will be downloaded onto the local machine without user interaction:
(uploaded a POC for easy demonstration: https://roy.demo.phpmyfaq.de/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en although a fresh installation overwrites this demo instance every 24 hours)
(as a logged in normal user, visit: https://roy.demo.phpmyfaq.de/content/1/20/en/20.html)
Impact
Malicious code or binaries could be dropped on visitors' machines when visiting the FAQ platform. Take a worm or ransomware for instance.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | all versions | 3.2.10 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
phpMyFAQ 3.2.10 - Unintended File Download Triggered by Embedded Frames
by Geo · Apr 16, 2025
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 3.2.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.