Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐘 Packagist

GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc

MEDIUM

thorsten/phpmyfaq Unintended File Download Triggered by Embedded Frames

Also known asCVE-2024-55889
Published
Dec 13, 2024
Updated
Aug 14, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
2.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk80th percentile-7.07%
0.00%3.79%7.57%11.4%2.0%2.1%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A vulnerability exists in the FAQ Record component where a privileged attacker can trigger a file download on a victim's machine upon page visit by embedding it in an <iframe> element without user interaction or explicit consent.

Details

In http://localhost/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en, where a FAQ record is either created or edited, an attacker can insert an iframe, as "source code", pointing to a prior "malicious" attachment that the attacker has uploaded via FAQ "new attachment" upload, such that any page visits to this FAQ will trigger an automated download (from the edit screen, download is automated; from the faq page view as a normal user, depending on the browser, a pop up confirmation may be presented before the actual download. Firebox browser, for instance, does not require any interactions). image

PoC

  1. create a new FAQ record and upload a "malicious" file - in my case, I uploaded an eicar file. take note of the uri, ie <p><iframe "index.php?action=attachment&id=2" image

  2. in the FAQ record, insert a "source code" blob using the "< >" button

  3. insert in the following snippet: <p><iframe src="index.php?action=attachment&amp;id=2"></iframe></p> and save FAQ record

  4. once the edit page reloads, the malicious code will be downloaded onto the local machine without user interaction: image

(uploaded a POC for easy demonstration: https://roy.demo.phpmyfaq.de/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en although a fresh installation overwrites this demo instance every 24 hours)

(as a logged in normal user, visit: https://roy.demo.phpmyfaq.de/content/1/20/en/20.html)

Impact

Malicious code or binaries could be dropped on visitors' machines when visiting the FAQ platform. Take a worm or ransomware for instance.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistthorsten/phpmyfaqall versions3.2.10
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

EDB-52235webappsphp

phpMyFAQ 3.2.10 - Unintended File Download Triggered by Embedded Frames

by Geo · Apr 16, 2025

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 3.2.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A vulnerability exists in the FAQ Record component where a privileged attacker can trigger a file download on a victim's machine upon page visit by embedding it in an <iframe> element without user interaction or explicit consent. ### Details In http://localhost/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en, where a FAQ record is either created or edited, an attacker can insert an iframe, as "source code", pointing to a prior "malicious" attachment that the attacker has uploaded via FAQ "new attachment" upload, such that any page visits to this FAQ will trigger an automated downl
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.