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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2024-55889 — phpmyfaq

MEDIUMFix: thorsten/phpMyFAQ@fa0f736

CVE-2024-55889 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) CWE-451 vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.

phpMyFAQ Vulnerable to Unintended File Download Triggered by Embedded Frames

Also known asGHSA-m3r7-8gw7-qwvc
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-55889.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
2.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs83th percentile — riskier than 83% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%3.77%7.54%11.3%7.0%2.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A vulnerability exists in the FAQ Record component where a privileged attacker can trigger a file download on a victim's machine upon page visit by embedding it in an <iframe> element without user interaction or explicit consent.

Details

In http://localhost/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en, where a FAQ record is either created or edited, an attacker can insert an iframe, as "source code", pointing to a prior "malicious" attachment that the attacker has uploaded via FAQ "new attachment" upload, such that any page visits to this FAQ will trigger an automated download (from the edit screen, download is automated; from the faq page view as a normal user, depending on the browser, a pop up confirmation may be presented before the actual download. Firebox browser, for instance, does not require any interactions). image

PoC

  1. create a new FAQ record and upload a "malicious" file - in my case, I uploaded an eicar file. take note of the uri, ie <p><iframe "index.php?action=attachment&id=2" image

  2. in the FAQ record, insert a "source code" blob using the "< >" button

  3. insert in the following snippet: <p><iframe src="index.php?action=attachment&amp;id=2"></iframe></p> and save FAQ record

  4. once the edit page reloads, the malicious code will be downloaded onto the local machine without user interaction: image

(uploaded a POC for easy demonstration: https://roy.demo.phpmyfaq.de/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en although a fresh installation overwrites this demo instance every 24 hours)

(as a logged in normal user, visit: https://roy.demo.phpmyfaq.de/content/1/20/en/20.html)

Impact

Malicious code or binaries could be dropped on visitors' machines when visiting the FAQ platform. Take a worm or ransomware for instance.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistthorsten/phpmyfaqall versions3.2.10composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^3.2.10

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
phpmyfaqphpmyfaq
< 3.2.10
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

EDB-52235webappsphp

phpMyFAQ 3.2.10 - Unintended File Download Triggered by Embedded Frames

by Geo · Apr 16, 2025

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 3.2.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-55889 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A vulnerability exists in the FAQ Record component where a privileged attacker can trigger a file download on a victim's machine upon page visit by embedding it in an <iframe> element without user interaction or explicit consent. ### Details In http://localhost/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en, where a FAQ record is either created or edited, an attacker can insert an iframe, as "source code", pointing to a prior "malicious" attachment that the attacker has uploaded via FAQ "new attachment" upload, such that any page visits to this FAQ will trigger an automated downl
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-55889 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2024-55889: phpmyfaq — Fixed in 3.2.10