GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h is a critical-severity (CVSS 9) Code Injection vulnerability in omnigent. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Omnigent: Shared Agent Bundle Overwrite Leads to Authenticated Runner RCE
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 367,996 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
omnigentReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent.
Shared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a stdio MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command.
Details
The vulnerable endpoint is the full agent bundle upload route: PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent
This route checks whether the caller can edit the session: LEVEL_EDIT session permission check
But it does not check whether the bound agent is a shared/template agent.
Shared/template agents have:
agent.session_id is None
The API already exposes that these agents are not meant to be MCP-editable: mcp_servers_editable is false for shared/template agents
The direct MCP edit endpoint correctly blocks shared/template agents: session_mcp_servers.py shared-agent guard
if agent.session_id is None:
raise OmnigentError("Built-in agents are read-only through this endpoint.")
The full bundle upload endpoint is missing that same guard. It stores the uploaded bundle and updates the agent row: agent_store.update(agent.id, new_loc)
For shared/template agents, this changes the shared agent itself, not only the attacker's session.
This becomes command execution because stdio MCP servers start the configured command as a runner subprocess: tools/mcp.py stdio subprocess launch
Suggested fix: add the same agent.session_id is None guard to PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent.
Impact
This is authenticated RCE against Omnigent runner hosts. A normal authenticated user with edit access to their own session can poison a shared/template agent bundle, even though that agent is shown as not MCP-editable. The poisoned bundle can then be used by future sessions created from the same shared agent.
Because stdio MCP servers run as local subprocesses, the attacker-controlled command executes with the permissions of the Omnigent runner process. In a shared or company-hosted deployment, this can let an attacker read runner-accessible files and credentials, modify workspace data, disrupt runner availability, pivot to internal services reachable from the runner, or establish an interactive remote shell if outbound networking is allowed.
This is high impact because it turns normal shared-agent session access into command execution on runner infrastructure used by other sessions.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | omnigent | all versions | 0.3.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for omnigent. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update omnigent to 0.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.