CVE-2026-62674 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9) Code Injection vulnerability in omnigent. A fix is available for omnigent — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Omnigent: Shared Agent Bundle Overwrite Leads to Authenticated Runner RCE
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-62674.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-62674 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 391,411 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
omnigentReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent.
Shared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a stdio MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command.
Details
The vulnerable endpoint is the full agent bundle upload route: PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent
This route checks whether the caller can edit the session: LEVEL_EDIT session permission check
But it does not check whether the bound agent is a shared/template agent.
Shared/template agents have:
agent.session_id is None
The API already exposes that these agents are not meant to be MCP-editable: mcp_servers_editable is false for shared/template agents
The direct MCP edit endpoint correctly blocks shared/template agents: session_mcp_servers.py shared-agent guard
if agent.session_id is None:
raise OmnigentError("Built-in agents are read-only through this endpoint.")
The full bundle upload endpoint is missing that same guard. It stores the uploaded bundle and updates the agent row: agent_store.update(agent.id, new_loc)
For shared/template agents, this changes the shared agent itself, not only the attacker's session.
This becomes command execution because stdio MCP servers start the configured command as a runner subprocess: tools/mcp.py stdio subprocess launch
Suggested fix: add the same agent.session_id is None guard to PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent.
Impact
This is authenticated RCE against Omnigent runner hosts. A normal authenticated user with edit access to their own session can poison a shared/template agent bundle, even though that agent is shown as not MCP-editable. The poisoned bundle can then be used by future sessions created from the same shared agent.
Because stdio MCP servers run as local subprocesses, the attacker-controlled command executes with the permissions of the Omnigent runner process. In a shared or company-hosted deployment, this can let an attacker read runner-accessible files and credentials, modify workspace data, disrupt runner availability, pivot to internal services reachable from the runner, or establish an interactive remote shell if outbound networking is allowed.
This is high impact because it turns normal shared-agent session access into command execution on runner infrastructure used by other sessions.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | omnigent | all versions | 0.3.0pip install --upgrade 'omnigent==0.3.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for omnigent, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update omnigent to 0.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-62674 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-62674 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.