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AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new hostGHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w

Fix: AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client@15b2545

GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w is a CWE-319 vulnerability in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. A fix is available for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-107282
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs8th percentile — riskier than 8% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client☕org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

When a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host.

A replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a ResponseFilter that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design.

  • The socket to host B is filed in the connection pool under host A's key. A later request the application addresses to A is served over the connection to B, and A's Authorization header goes to B.
  • Over a CONNECT tunnel, the client tunnels to B and negotiates TLS with B correctly, then writes A's request into that tunnel. B receives A's path, A's Host, and A's Authorization. TLS does not protect against this, because the handshake really is with B, so no certificate mismatch occurs.
  • The replay reuses the original realm, so A's credentials are regenerated onto a replay request that carries no realm of its own. The cross-origin redirect path strips realms for exactly this reason; the replay path never did.
  • The stale value also decides whether TLS is used at all. When the original request was http:// and the replay is https://, no SSL handler is installed and the replayed request, credentials included, is written in cleartext.

Affected versions

  • 3.x: up to and including 3.0.12
  • 2.x: up to and including 2.16.0

Both lines are affected identically. This is long-standing behaviour, not a recent regression.

Patches

Fixed in 3.0.13 on the 3.x line and in 2.16.1 on the 2.x line. The target request now moves when a request is replayed, and the proxy moves with it: the proxy is part of the connection pool key, so correcting only the host would convert a harmless pool miss into a hit and route a proxied connection to a direct request.

Workarounds

Do not use a ResponseFilter that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy. Replaying to the same host is not affected.

Details

NettyRequestSender.newNettyRequestAndResponseFuture calls setCurrentRequest without setTargetRequest, and replayRequest does not move the target either. The stale target is then read by the pool key derivation in NettyResponseFuture, by ConnectSuccessInterceptor when it writes the tunnelled request, by the realm selection in NettyRequestSender, and by NettyConnectListener when it decides whether to install an SSL handler.

Existing replay tests do not cover this, because all of them replay to the same host.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenorg.asynchttpclient:async-http-client≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.0.133.0.13org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:3.0.13
☕Mavenorg.asynchttpclient:async-http-client≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.16.12.16.1org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:2.16.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to 3.0.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatCritical

Why not Critical: 1. Does NOT provide RCE (only credential theft) 2. Attack complexity is HIGH (requires specific app configuration) 3. Not wormable 4. Requires failover/retry features to be enabled (not universal)

Workaround published by Red Hat
A workaround is available: do not use a ResponseFilter that replays a request to a different host, and disable request retries, whenever the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy; replaying to the same host is not affected. Otherwise, upgrade to a fixed AsyncHttpClient version - 3.0.13 or later on the 3.x line, or 2.16.1 or later on the 2.x line - which move the target request and proxy context when a request is replayed.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact When a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host. A replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a `ResponseFilter` that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design. * The socket to host
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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