How severe is GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m?

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m affects the following packages: github.com/basekick-labs/arc (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m?

Update github.com/basekick-labs/arc to 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/basekick-labs/arc, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m?

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.6%, placing it in the 50th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m?

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is classified as Information Exposure (CWE-200), Missing Authentication (CWE-306), Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m was published on June 11, 2026 and was last updated on June 25, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoSGHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m

Fix: Basekick-Labs/arc@32a4091

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is a Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/basekick-labs/arc. A fix is available for github.com/basekick-labs/arc — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-48050GO-2026-5457

Published

Jun 11, 2026

Updated

Jun 25, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs50th percentile — riskier than 50% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/basekick-labs/arc

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Arc registers Go's net/http/pprof handlers at /debug/pprof/* via app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go, and /debug/pprof is added to PublicPrefixes in cmd/arc/main.go. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.

Impact

Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can:

Fetch /debug/pprof/heap — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached *TokenInfo (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at auth.go:543).
Fetch /debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2 — leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.
Fetch /debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N — pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request → minutes of server CPU).
Fetch /debug/pprof/trace — long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.

No authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the seconds parameter.

Patches

https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1

Planned mitigation:

Gate pprof registration behind an env var (ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1) that defaults to off.
When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (127.0.0.1:6060 via dedicated net/http server) so it's never reachable from the public API port.
Remove /debug/pprof from PublicPrefixes.
Fix the HasPrefix bug where "/debug/pprofX" matches "/debug/pprof".

Workarounds

Block /debug/pprof* at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.
Restrict Arc's API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
Patch the running build: comment out app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go and rebuild.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/basekick-labs/arc`	all versions	0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949`go get github.com/basekick-labs/arc@v0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/basekick-labs/arc, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/basekick-labs/arc to 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Arc registers Go's `net/http/pprof` handlers at `/debug/pprof/*` via `app.Use(pprof.New())` in `internal/api/server.go`, and `/debug/pprof` is added to `PublicPrefixes` in `cmd/arc/main.go`. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication. ### Impact Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can: - Fetch `/debug/pprof/heap` — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached `*TokenInfo` (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext

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