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GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m

Fix: Basekick-Labs/arc@32a4091

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is a Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/basekick-labs/arc. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS

Also known asCVE-2026-48050GO-2026-5457
Published
Jun 11, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs28th percentile — riskier than 28% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/basekick-labs/arc

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Arc registers Go's net/http/pprof handlers at /debug/pprof/* via app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go, and /debug/pprof is added to PublicPrefixes in cmd/arc/main.go. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.

Impact

Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can:

  • Fetch /debug/pprof/heap — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached *TokenInfo (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at auth.go:543).
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2 — leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N — pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request → minutes of server CPU).
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/trace — long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.

No authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the seconds parameter.

Patches

https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1

Planned mitigation:

  1. Gate pprof registration behind an env var (ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1) that defaults to off.
  2. When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (127.0.0.1:6060 via dedicated net/http server) so it's never reachable from the public API port.
  3. Remove /debug/pprof from PublicPrefixes.
  4. Fix the HasPrefix bug where "/debug/pprofX" matches "/debug/pprof".

Workarounds

  • Block /debug/pprof* at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.
  • Restrict Arc's API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
  • Patch the running build: comment out app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go and rebuild.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/basekick-labs/arcall versions0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/basekick-labs/arc. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/basekick-labs/arc to 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Arc registers Go's `net/http/pprof` handlers at `/debug/pprof/*` via `app.Use(pprof.New())` in `internal/api/server.go`, and `/debug/pprof` is added to `PublicPrefixes` in `cmd/arc/main.go`. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication. ### Impact Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can: - Fetch `/debug/pprof/heap` — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached `*TokenInfo` (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m: arc Denial of Service | O3 Security