Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-47735 — arc

Fix: Basekick-Labs/arc@91bdc29

CVE-2026-47735 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/basekick-labs/arc. A fix is available for github.com/basekick-labs/arc — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks

Also known asGHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5GO-2026-5523
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-47735.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs36th percentile — riskier than 36% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.93%0.3%0.4%0.4%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/basekick-labs/arc

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.

Impact

Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:

POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}

Confirmed reachable targets:

  • auth.db — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.
  • arc.toml — S3 secrets, TLS keys.
  • /proc/self/environ — environment-variable secrets.
  • Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
  • SSRF when httpfs is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...') reaches instance metadata IPs.

Patches

Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:

  1. SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...] enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).
  2. SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false (one-way at runtime).
  3. Verified by reading back the flag.

After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.

Workarounds

  • Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
  • Temporary mitigation: add read_csv*/read_json*/glob etc. to dangerousSQLPattern in internal/api/query.go pending 2026.06.1.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/basekick-labs/arcall versions0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02go get github.com/basekick-labs/arc@v0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/basekick-labs/arc, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/basekick-labs/arc to 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-47735 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. ### Impact Any authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read ar
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-47735 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-47735: arc SSRF — Fix Available