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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c

MEDIUM

GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-444 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Netty: HttpObjectDecoder skips arbitrary initial control characters when only initial CRLF characters are permitted

Also known asCVE-2026-50020
Published
Jun 15, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 2, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs14th percentile — riskier than 14% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.49%0.73%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Jul 26Sep 26Sep 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
io.netty:netty-codec-httpio.netty:netty-codec-http

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Before reading the first request-line, HttpObjectDecoder skips every byte for which Character.isISOControl(b) is true (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore empty CRLF lines preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently.

Affected Code

FileLinesRole
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java1298–1313ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE static initialiser — marks all ISO control chars
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java1307–1313SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS_BYTES ByteProcessor — skips the entire set
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java1275–1289LineParser.skipControlChars — advances readerIndex past all matching bytes

Specification Analysis

RFC 9112 §2.2 — Message Parsing

In the interest of robustness, a server that is expecting to receive and parse a request-line SHOULD ignore at least one empty line (CRLF) received prior to the request-line.

An HTTP/1.1 user agent MUST NOT preface or follow a request with an extra CRLF.

Deviation

The RFC names a single permitted exception: an empty line (bare CRLF, i.e. the two-byte sequence \r\n). The ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE table is initialised as:

for (byte b = Byte.MIN_VALUE; b < Byte.MAX_VALUE; b++) {
    ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE[128 + b] =
        Character.isISOControl(b) || isWhitespace(b);
}

Character.isISOControl returns true for 0x000x1F and 0x7F. This includes NUL (0x00), SOH (0x01), STX (0x02), BEL (0x07), DEL (0x7F), and every other non-CRLF control character. The SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS state runs this scan unconditionally before the first READ_INITIAL, meaning any sequence of such bytes prepended to a request is silently consumed.

A load balancer or TLS terminator that does not perform the same scan sees a different message boundary than Netty does, which is the basis of a request-desync / smuggling attack.

Suggested Unit Test

Add to HttpRequestDecoderTest.java.

@Test
public void testNonCrlfControlBytesPrecedingRequestLineAreRejected() {
    // RFC 9112 §2.2: servers SHOULD ignore "at least one empty line (CRLF)" before the
    // request-line.  Non-CRLF control bytes are not part of this robustness allowance
    // and must not be silently swallowed.
    EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());

    ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer();
    buf.writeByte(0x00);   // NUL  — not an empty CRLF line
    buf.writeByte(0x01);   // SOH  — not an empty CRLF line
    buf.writeCharSequence(
            "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n",
            CharsetUtil.US_ASCII);

    channel.writeInbound(buf);
    HttpRequest req = channel.readInbound();

    // Current behaviour: NUL and SOH are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE, so they are
    // silently skipped; the request decodes successfully and isFailure() == false.
    //
    // RFC-correct behaviour: only empty CRLF lines should be ignored; NUL/SOH must
    // cause a parse error — isFailure() == true.
    assertTrue(
            req.decoderResult().isFailure(),
            "Non-CRLF control bytes before the request-line must not be silently skipped " +
            "(RFC 9112 §2.2 allows only empty CRLF lines)");

    assertFalse(channel.finish());
}

Current behaviour (unfixed): skipControlChars advances past 0x00 and 0x01 because both are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE; the request parses normally, isFailure() is false → test fails.

Expected behaviour after fix: only CRLF empty lines are tolerated; non-CRLF control bytes produce an error, isFailure() is true → test passes.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.15.Final4.2.15.Final
Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-httpall versions4.1.135.Final

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.15.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This Moderate flaw in Netty's HttpObjectDecoder could lead to data manipulation in Red Hat products utilizing pipelined or multiplexed HTTP transports. The vulnerability arises from the decoder's over-permissive handling of control characters and whitespace, which can cause front-end components to misinterpret HTTP…

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Before reading the first request-line, `HttpObjectDecoder` skips every byte for which `Character.isISOControl(b)` is `true` (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore **empty CRLF lines** preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c: netty-codec-http | O3 Security