Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐍
🐍 PyPI
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3

MEDIUMFix: pgadmin-org/pgadmin4@d336c1e

GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in pgadmin4. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

pgAdmin 4: Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts

Also known asCVE-2026-7820PYSEC-2026-2869
Published
May 11, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 13, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍pgadmin4

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307) in pgAdmin 4.

pgAdmin enforces MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS only inside its custom /authenticate/login view. Flask-Security's default /login view, which is registered automatically by security.init_app() and is reachable on every server, never consulted the User.locked field: pgAdmin's User model relied on Flask-Security's UserMixin.is_locked() (which always returns 'not locked') and Flask-Login's is_active (which only checks the active column, not locked). An attacker who triggered an account lockout via /authenticate/login could therefore obtain a session by re-submitting valid credentials directly to /login, defeating the brute-force-protection control for accounts using the INTERNAL authentication source. The same bypass also means that login attempts via /login are never rate-limited, so an attacker can perform an unbounded online password-guessing attack against INTERNAL accounts regardless of MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS.

Fix overrides User.is_active and User.is_locked() so the locked column is enforced on every authentication path. LDAP, OAuth2, Kerberos, and Webserver users are not reachable by this bypass because they have no local password and are rejected by Flask-Security's LoginForm.validate before the locked check; the lockout itself is also internal-only (the /authenticate/login view filters by auth_source=INTERNAL).

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpgadmin4all versions9.15

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pgadmin4. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update pgadmin4 to 9.15 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307) in pgAdmin 4. pgAdmin enforces MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS only inside its custom /authenticate/login view. Flask-Security's default /login view, which is registered automatically by security.init_app() and is reachable on every server, never consulted the User.locked field: pgAdmin's User model relied on Flask-Security's UserMixin.is_locked() (which always returns 'not locked') and Flask-Login's is_active (which only checks the active column, not locked). An attacker who triggered an account lockout via /authenticate/login could ther
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-hv9p-2pqf-r5w3: pgadmin4 (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security