CVE-2026-7820 — pgadmin4
Fix: pgadmin-org/pgadmin4@d336c1eCVE-2026-7820 is a security vulnerability in pgadmin4. A fix is available for pgadmin4 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
pgAdmin 4: Account-lockout bypass via Flask-Security default /login view
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-7820.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
pgadmin4Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307) in pgAdmin 4.
pgAdmin enforces MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS only inside its custom /authenticate/login view. Flask-Security's default /login view, which is registered automatically by security.init_app() and is reachable on every server, never consulted the User.locked field: pgAdmin's User model relied on Flask-Security's UserMixin.is_locked() (which always returns 'not locked') and Flask-Login's is_active (which only checks the active column, not locked). An attacker who triggered an account lockout via /authenticate/login could therefore obtain a session by re-submitting valid credentials directly to /login, defeating the brute-force-protection control for accounts using the INTERNAL authentication source. The same bypass also means that login attempts via /login are never rate-limited, so an attacker can perform an unbounded online password-guessing attack against INTERNAL accounts regardless of MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS.
Fix overrides User.is_active and User.is_locked() so the locked column is enforced on every authentication path. LDAP, OAuth2, Kerberos, and Webserver users are not reachable by this bypass because they have no local password and are rejected by Flask-Security's LoginForm.validate before the locked check; the lockout itself is also internal-only (the /authenticate/login view filters by auth_source=INTERNAL).
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pgadmin4 | all versions | 9.15pip install --upgrade 'pgadmin4==9.15' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pgadmin4, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pgadmin4 to 9.15 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-7820 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-7820 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-7820. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-7820 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-7820 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.