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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

MEDIUM

GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. A fix is available for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet — see the affected versions and patch details below.

PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via number format code with @ text placeholder bypasses htmlspecialchars in HTML writer

Also known asCVE-2026-40296
Published
Apr 28, 2026
Updated
May 8, 2026
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
5 / 5
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs13th percentile — riskier than 13% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

5 pkgs affected
🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

It was discovered that there is a way to bypass HTML escaping in the HTML writer using custom number format codes.

The Problem

In Writer/Html.php around line 1592, the code checks if the formatted cell data equals the original data to decide whether to apply htmlspecialchars():

if ($cellData === $origData) {
    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ...);
}

When a cell has a custom number format containing @ (text placeholder) with any additional literal characters, the formatter replaces @ with the cell value and adds the extra characters. This makes $cellData !== $origData, so htmlspecialchars() is skipped entirely.

Even a single trailing space in the format (@ ) is enough to bypass the escape.

Proof of Concept

use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Cell\DataType;

$spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet();
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();

// XSS payload with malicious number format
$sheet->setCellValueExplicit('A1', '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>', DataType::TYPE_STRING);
$sheet->getStyle('A1')->getNumberFormat()->setFormatCode('. @');

$writer = new Html($spreadsheet);
$writer->save('output.html');

The generated HTML contains:

<td>. <img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)></td>

The XSS payload is completely unescaped.

Tested Bypass Formats

Format CodeResultEscaped?
General (default)Original valueYES (safe)
. @. + valueNO (XSS!)
@ (trailing space)value + NO (XSS!)
x@x + valueNO (XSS!)

This was tested with PhpSpreadsheet 4.5.0 and confirmed the XSS executes in the browser.

Impact

Any application that:

  1. Accepts uploaded XLSX files from users
  2. Converts them to HTML using PhpSpreadsheet's HTML writer
  3. Displays the HTML to other users

...is vulnerable to stored XSS. The attacker embeds the payload in a cell value and sets a custom number format in the XLSX file's xl/styles.xml.

Suggested Fix

Always apply htmlspecialchars() regardless of whether formatting changed the value:

// Instead of conditional escaping:
$cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_SUBSTITUTE, 'UTF-8');

Or escape AFTER formatting, not conditionally based on equality.

Reporter

Keyvan Hardani

Affected Packages

5 total 5 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet4.0.0&&< 5.7.05.7.0composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^5.7.0
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet3.3.0&&< 3.10.53.10.5composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^3.10.5
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet2.2.0&&< 2.4.52.4.5composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^2.4.5
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet2.0.0&&< 2.1.162.1.16composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^2.1.16
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheetall versions1.30.4composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^1.30.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 5.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

It was discovered that there is a way to bypass HTML escaping in the HTML writer using custom number format codes. ## The Problem In `Writer/Html.php` around line 1592, the code checks if the formatted cell data equals the original data to decide whether to apply `htmlspecialchars()`: ```php if ($cellData === $origData) { $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ...); } ``` When a cell has a custom number format containing `@` (text placeholder) with any additional literal characters, the formatter replaces `@` with the cell value and adds the extra characters. This makes `$cellData !==
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc: XSS (Medium 5.4) | O3 Security