GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg — nocodb
GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in nocodb. A fix is available for nocodb — see the affected versions and patch details below.
NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
nocodbnpmDescription
Summary
The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].
Details
The vulnerable sink is in packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts:
isValidRedirectUrlvalidated onlytypeof === 'string'and non-empty trim — no scheme check.- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared
anchor.hosttowindow.location.host, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assignedwindow.location.href = redirectUrl(otherwise). - For non-network schemes such as
javascript:,data:,vbscript:, andfile:,anchor.hostis the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.
The redirect_url field is writable by any user with editor role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.
Impact
- Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab. The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at
localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].token. - Action under the viewer's identity. With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.
- Single-click viewer flow. Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.
Credit
This issue was reported by @kah-ja (turingpoint.de).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | nocodb | all versions | 2026.05.1npm install nocodb@2026.05.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nocodb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update nocodb to 2026.05.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.