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GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

MEDIUM

GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-407 vulnerability in js-yaml. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

Also known asCVE-2026-53550
Published
Jun 15, 2026
Updated
Jun 29, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
📦js-yaml📦js-yaml

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

  • storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
  • For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
  • mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0} b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]} all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time. Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows. Relevant code path: lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode, valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos) Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
  key = sourceKeys[index];
  if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
    setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
    overridableKeys[key] = true;
  }
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

  • one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
  • K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources, so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment: js-yaml version: 4.1.1 Node.js: v24.5.0 Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently) Reproduction script: Create many keys in one anchored map (&a). Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...]. Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a). Observed repeated runs (same machine): K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms Control (single merge, similar key counts): K=2000: ~1–2 ms K=4000: ~3 ms K=8000: ~5 ms Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity). Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    var seen = new Set();
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      var src = valueNode[index];
      if (seen.has(src)) continue;   // idempotent; skip redundant alias
      seen.add(src);
      mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmjs-yaml4.0.0&&< 4.2.04.2.0
📦npmjs-yamlall versions3.15.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for js-yaml. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update js-yaml to 4.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in `js-yaml` merge-key processing (`<<`) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence. This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service. ### Details The issue is in merge handling inside `lib/loader.js`: - `storeMappingPair(...)` iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is `tag:yaml.org,2002:merge`. - For each element, it calls `mergeMappings(
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.