GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
MEDIUMGHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-407 vulnerability in js-yaml. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases
Blast Radius
js-yaml📦js-yamlReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.
Details
The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:
storeMappingPair(...)iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag istag:yaml.org,2002:merge.- For each element, it calls
mergeMappings(...). mergeMappings(...)computesObject.keys(source)and performs_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)checks for each key.
When input is of the form:
a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0} b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]} all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time. Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows. Relevant code path: lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)
Root cause
File: lib/loader.js Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode, valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos) Lines: ~359-366
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}
When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does
sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}
Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:
- one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
- K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination
Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.
YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.
PoC
Environment: js-yaml version: 4.1.1 Node.js: v24.5.0 Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently) Reproduction script: Create many keys in one anchored map (&a). Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...]. Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a). Observed repeated runs (same machine): K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms Control (single merge, similar key counts): K=2000: ~1–2 ms K=4000: ~3 ms K=8000: ~5 ms Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.
Impact
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity). Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.
Suggested fix:
Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:
dedupe in storeMappingPair:
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | js-yaml | ≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.2.0 | 4.2.0 |
| 📦npm | js-yaml | all versions | 3.15.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for js-yaml. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update js-yaml to 4.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.