GHSA-h3rm-78g3-j7cp
HIGH@better-auth/stripe: cross-organization billing tampering in organization subscription actions
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
@better-auth/stripenpmDescription
Am I affected?
You are affected if all of these are true:
- You use
@better-auth/stripefrom version 1.4.11 up to a patched version below. This covers the stable line through 1.6.20 and every 1.7.0 beta through 1.7.0-beta.9. - The Stripe plugin has subscriptions turned on (
subscription.enabled: true). - Organization subscriptions are turned on (
organization.enabled: true) and you have set anauthorizeReferencecallback. - A user can join more than one org. So a user can be a member of an org whose billing they should not manage.
You are not affected if you only use user subscriptions. You are also not affected if org subscriptions are turned off.
Summary
An org subscription action can run against the wrong org. The actions are cancel, change plan, restore, and open the billing portal. The plugin checks permission against the org id in the request query string. It then runs the action against the caller's active org from their session. When these two ids differ, a member can act on billing for an org they may not manage. The target is always an org the caller belongs to.
Details
The plugin runs two steps for each org subscription action. First, a middleware decides if the caller may use the requested org. It reads the org id from the request body or the query string. It then passes that id to your authorizeReference callback. Second, the route handler runs the action. The handler reads the org id from the request body only. It falls back to the active org in the session when the body has no id.
The gap is the query string. A caller puts an org they may manage in the query string. The middleware approves that org. The handler ignores the query string. It finds no id in the body, so it acts on the caller's active org instead. The check and the action no longer agree.
Patches
Upgrade to one of these patched versions:
- Stable:
@better-auth/[email protected]or later. - Beta:
@better-auth/[email protected]or later.
The fix resolves the org id once in the middleware. It passes that single value to the handler. The approved org and the acted-on org are now always the same.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, make authorizeReference approve only the caller's active org. Return false when the requested id is not the active org id. Keep your existing role check too:
if (referenceId !== session.activeOrganizationId) {
return false;
}
This forces the approved org and the active org to be the same value.
Impact
- A signed-in member can make a subscription action run against the wrong org. The action can be cancel, change plan, restore, or billing portal. The target is limited to orgs the member belongs to.
- Through the billing portal, a member can reach another org's billing details. This includes payment methods, invoices, and subscription state.
Credit
Reported and fixed by Taesu (@bytaesu).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @better-auth/stripe | ≥ 1.4.11&&< 1.6.21 | 1.6.21 |
| 📦npm | @better-auth/stripe | ≥ 1.7.0-beta.0&&< 1.7.0-beta.10 | 1.7.0-beta.10 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @better-auth/stripe. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @better-auth/stripe to 1.6.21 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h3rm-78g3-j7cp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h3rm-78g3-j7cp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h3rm-78g3-j7cp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h3rm-78g3-j7cp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h3rm-78g3-j7cp across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.