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GHSA-gmfg-3v4q-9qr4

Authelia: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation Leads to Potential Cross-site Scripting

Also known asCVE-2026-33525GO-2026-4818
Published
Mar 24, 2026
Updated
Mar 30, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk13th percentile+0.21%
0.00%0.24%0.48%0.73%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/authelia/authelia/v4

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Official Weighted Severity Rating: Low

This exploit is very unlikely to be the case for most users as it requires configuration of the Content Security Policy template value. Below represents a safe value, any other value other than unconfigured should be very carefully evaluated regardless of the fix.

server:
  headers:
    csp_template: ''
AUTHELIA_SERVER_HEADERS_CSP_TEMPLATE=

Provided the following conditions are met:

  1. The Content Security Policy:
    1. Has been disabled or modified from the entirely safe default value; and
    2. Has been completely disabled by the Administrator by omitting the header explicitly at the proxy (worst practice); or
    3. Has been effectively disabled by modifying script-src allowing unsafe inline scripts rather than using hashes AND effectively disabled by modifying connect-src allowing connections to arbitrary websites.
  2. Authelia is being hosted on a domain that has other applications that can write to the cookie for the Authelia domain.
  3. One of the other applications noted in 2 has an vulnerability that can be exploited to execute malicious javascript with similar requirements to 1.
  4. The attacker can exploit the javascript in 3 to delete the existing language cookie scoped to the fully qualified domain name of Authelia with the same site value of strict (which is not possible in most scenarios unless the application in 3 has the exact same domain or a subdomain of the Authelia domain).
  5. The attacker can exploit the javascript in 3 to write a new language cookie scoped for a domain that Authelia is sent cookies for.
  6. The attacker can get a user to meet the conditions required to execute the javascript in 3.
  7. You are running Authelia 4.39.15.

An attacker may potentially be able to inject javascript into the Authelia login page. Unless both the script-src and connect-src directives have been modified it's almost impossible for this to have a meaningful impact. However if both of these are and they are done so without consideration to their potential impact; there is a are situations where this vulnerability could be exploited.

This is caused to the lack of neutralization of the langauge cookie value when rendering the HTML template.

This vulnerability is likely difficult to discover though fingerprinting due to the way Authelia is designed but it should not be considered impossible. The additional requirement to identify the secondary application is however likely to be significantly harder to identify along side this, but also likely easier to fingerprint.

Patches

Upgrade to 4.39.16 or Downgrade to 4.39.14.

Proof of Concept

No current proof of concept exists that does not require manual manipulation of the browser which is effectively a local attack where all privileges have been compromised without the need for this attack vector (i.e. installation of userscripts or a browser plugin which would be able to compromise any website or web app). There is a decent chance one will exist or certain conditions exist that could lead to the vulnerability being exploitable.

Discovery of this flaw has prompted an deliberate evaluation of any other potential flaws similar to this which did not yield any results, as well as a deliberate evaluation of best practices in this area which has resulted in a minor tweak to hardening measures. These additional hardening measures should not have any effect (explicit definition of the script-src and connect-src policies, which are the same value as default was previously), but it should theoretically prevent an accidental change in the future degrading the existing security layers we implement.

Workarounds

The overwhelming majority of installations will not be affected and no workarounds are necessary. The default value for the Content Security Policy makes exploiting this weakness completely impossible. It's only possible via the deliberate removal of the Content Security Policy or deliberate inclusion of clearly noted unsafe policies.

Use the default Content Security Policy

The default Content Security Policy is completely secure and prevents any third party javascript the browser evaluates against it.

server:
  headers:
    csp_template: ''

Using a custom Content Security Policy is a very advanced choice that requires specialist knowledge. The use of unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval, unsafe-hashes, etc. are particularly problematic as they effectively allow arbitrary script execution (if a security policy includes an option that says unsafe it's probably a good indication you should not use it).

Upgrade or Downgrade

Both the next version and previous version of Authelia do not have this bug.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/authelia/authelia/v44.39.15&&< 4.39.164.39.16

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/authelia/authelia/v4. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/authelia/authelia/v4 to 4.39.16 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gmfg-3v4q-9qr4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gmfg-3v4q-9qr4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gmfg-3v4q-9qr4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact **Official Weighted Severity Rating:** Low This exploit is very unlikely to be the case for most users as it requires configuration of the Content Security Policy template value. Below represents a safe value, **_any other value_** other than unconfigured should be **_very carefully evaluated_** regardless of the fix. ```yaml server: headers: csp_template: '' ``` ```env AUTHELIA_SERVER_HEADERS_CSP_TEMPLATE= ``` Provided the following conditions are met: 1. The Content Security Policy: 1. Has been disabled or modified from the entirely safe default value; and 2. H
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gmfg-3v4q-9qr4 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-gmfg-3v4q-9qr4 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.