GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2
Fix: risc0/risc0-ethereum#605GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 is a CWE-159 vulnerability in risc0-ethereum-contracts. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment
Real-World Exposure
risc0-ethereum-contractsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the Steel.validateCommitment Solidity library function will return true for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.
This violates the semantics of validateCommitment, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).
Because this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.
Fix
Please see #605 for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of risc0-ethereum 2.1.1 and 2.2.0.
Recommended actions
Users for the Steel Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using Steel.validateCommitment in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.
Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.
Credit
A thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | risc0-ethereum-contracts | all versions | 2.1.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for risc0-ethereum-contracts. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update risc0-ethereum-contracts to 2.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.