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GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2

RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment

Also known asCVE-2025-52884
Published
Jun 25, 2025
Updated
Jun 25, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk27th percentile-0.14%
0.00%0.33%0.66%0.99%0.1%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀risc0-ethereum-contracts

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the Steel.validateCommitment Solidity library function will return true for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.

This violates the semantics of validateCommitment, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).

Because this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.

Fix

Please see #605 for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of risc0-ethereum 2.1.1 and 2.2.0.

Recommended actions

Users for the Steel Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using Steel.validateCommitment in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.

Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.

Credit

A thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iorisc0-ethereum-contractsall versions2.1.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for risc0-ethereum-contracts. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update risc0-ethereum-contracts to 2.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.