GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf
nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite
Blast Radius
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Description
internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245 — the enrollment_tokens.token column holds the raw UUID token. ConsumeToken does WHERE token = ? against the raw string. Compare with operator_api_keys.key_hash, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in internal/api/middleware.go:51-53).
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
Threat model
Read access to nebula-mgmt.db: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not.
An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity.
Suggested fix
- Schema migration: rename
enrollment_tokens.token→token_hash(or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows). - Store SHA-256 of token on create:
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) ConsumeTokenaccepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.
Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from uuid.New().String() (122 bits) to hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes) (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.
TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (internal/web/totp.go:74-78) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | all versions | 0.3.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/juev/nebula-mesh. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/juev/nebula-mesh to 0.3.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.