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📦 GitHub Actions

GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc

HIGH

Harden-Runner has a command injection weaknesses in `setup.ts` and `arc-runner.ts`

Also known asCVE-2024-52587
Published
Nov 18, 2024
Updated
Nov 19, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
2.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk84th percentile+0.68%
0.66%1.50%2.34%3.18%1.5%2.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦step-security/harden-runner

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Versions of step-security/harden-runner prior to v2.10.2 contain multiple command injection weaknesses via environment variables that could potentially be exploited under specific conditions. However, due to the current execution order of pre-steps in GitHub Actions and the placement of harden-runner as the first step in a job, the likelihood of exploitation is low as the Harden-Runner action reads the environment variable during the pre-step stage. There are no known exploits at this time.

Details

  1. setup.ts:169 1 performs execSync with a command that gets invoked after interpretation by the shell. This command includes an interpolated process.env.USER variable, which an attacker could modify (without actually creating a new user) to inject arbitrary shell expressions into this execSync. This may or may not be likely in practice, but I believe the hygienic way to perform the underlying operation is to use execFileSync or similar and bypass the underlying shell evaluation.

  2. setup.ts:229 2 has a nearly identical execSync to (1) above, but with $USER for shell-level interpolation rather than string interpolation. However, this is still injectable and would be best replaced by an execFileSync, per above.

  3. arc-runner:40-44 3 has an execSync with multiple string interpolations. Most of these do not appear immediately injectible (since they appear to come from presumed trusted API responses), but the expansion of getRunnerTempDir() may be injectable due to its dependence on potentially attacker-controllable environment variables (e.g. RUNNER_TEMP). The underlying operation appears to be a trivial file copy, so this entire subprocess should in theory be replaceable with ordinary NodeJS fs API calls instead.

  4. arc-runner:53 4 demonstrates the same weakness, and has the same resolution as (3).

  5. arc-runner:57 demonstrates the same weakness as (3) and (4), and has the same resolution.

  6. arc-runner:61 demonstrates the same weakness as (3), (4), and (5), and has the same resolution.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionsstep-security/harden-runnerall versions2.10.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for step-security/harden-runner. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update step-security/harden-runner to 2.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Versions of step-security/harden-runner prior to v2.10.2 contain multiple command injection weaknesses via environment variables that could potentially be exploited under specific conditions. However, due to the current execution order of pre-steps in GitHub Actions and the placement of harden-runner as the first step in a job, the likelihood of exploitation is low as the Harden-Runner action reads the environment variable during the pre-step stage. There are no known exploits at this time. ### Details 1. setup.ts:169 [1] performs `execSync` with a command that gets invoked af
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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O3 detects GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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